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Taxes, Morals, and Legitimacy 
Leo P. ~ a r t i n e z *  
"Morality is the herd instinct of the individual."' 
'TTlhe dread of evil is a much more forcible principle of 
human actions than the prospect of good."2 
The crime of tax evasion and the virtue of tax avoidance 
have always been viewed schizophrenically. On one hand we 
recognize the need for taxes and governments' dependence on 
revenue, while on the other we reflexively attempt to minimize 
our tax liability. Not surprisingly, the courts manifest and 
affirm our disparate approaches to taxation. One court tells us 
unequivocally, "[tlhere is always a moral obligation to pay 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
B.S. 1971, University of Kansas; M.S. 1975, University of Southern California; J.D. 
1978, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Special thanks to my 
colleagues William K.S. Wang, Calvin Massey, and Joe Grodin for their insights 
and inspiration in the creation of this article. The author gratefully acknowledges 
the diligent and able research assistance of Randi Covin, Margie Lariviere, Dan 
Howell and Alicia Gonzales. 
This Article is a direct result of the generous support provided by the Roger J. 
Traynor Fund for Scholarly Publications. Chief Justice Traynor believed that the 
tax laws should yield to transcendent concerns. In rejecting a loyalty oath as a 
precondition to tax exemption he stated: "Even in the face of a bona fide danger, 
the state has no power to embark on an  unnecessary wholesale suppression of 
liberty." First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 311 P.2d 508, 525 (Cal. 
1957) (Traynor, J., dissenting), reu'd, 357 U.S. 545 (1958); see Adrian A. Kragen, In 
Memoriam: Roger J. Traynor: Chief Justice Traynor and the Law of Taxation, 35 
HASTINGS L.J. 801, 811-12 (1984). 
1. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, DIE FROHLICHE WISSENCHAFT bk. 3, $ 108 (1882). 
2. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *55-56 (William D. Lewis ed., 
1900). 
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taxes."" Other courts reject this interplay of morality and 
taxes.4 
The interplay of morals and taxes is crucial to tax 
collection. If there is no moral obligation to pay taxes, the state 
can expect its citizens to weigh only the law or purely legal 
consequences in deciding whether compliance with tax laws 
makes sense as a matter of personal choice. The state, as a 
result, is almost forced to enact just tax laws or face a public 
increasingly willing to risk what is almost purely a legal price 
of tax evasion without moral sanction. 
At the outset, it seems necessary to affirm that taxpayers 
have no a priori duty to pay a portion of their incomes as taxes. 
If they did, all citizens violated that  duty until the Sixteenth 
Amendment permitted government to collect income taxes. 
Obviously, until that time no one would have asserted that 
citizens have either a legal or moral duty to pay income tax. 
Nor is the Internal Revenue Code an absolute determinant of a 
3. Snyder v. Routzahn, 55 F.2d 396, 397 (N.D. Ohio 1931); see also Jordan 
v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229 (1951) (holding that tax evasion involving fraud is 
a crime of moral turpitude); C i n c i ~ a t i  Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 
315 (1937) (holding that a specific tax, the revenue of which was set aside for the 
Philippine's use, is "in discharge of a high moral obligation"); Senior v. Braden, 295 
U.S. 422, 439 (1935) (Brandeis, Cardozo, Stone, JJ., dissenting) (recognizing use of 
taxes for purposes other than revenue generation); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 
(1922) (rejecting the argument that use of the taxing power to promote social 
welfare is as old as the power); United States a rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 113 F.2d 
429, 430-31 (2d Cir. 1940) ("[Olne who conducts a business with intent to defraud 
the government of taxes . . . stands in [no] different position from that of a person 
who defrauds a private citizen of property."). 
The Catholic Church supports the proposition that there is a moral obligation 
to obey the law and pay taxes. Its position is stated: 
Obedience to authority and co-responsibility for the common good generate 
a moral obligation to pay taxes, exercise the right to vote, and share in 
the defense of the country: 
Pay to all what is due them-taxes to whom taxes are due; 
revenue to whom revenue is due; respect to whom respect is due; 
honor to whom honor is due. 
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH $ 2240 (Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 
Provisional Draft 1992) (construing Romans 13:l-2). A Catholic theologian echoes 
the approach noting that those who "use fraud and other means to evade just 
taxes . . . sin mortally by committing the sin of theft." Rev. Martin T. Crowe, The 
Moral Obligation of Paying Just Taxes 42 (THE CATHOLIC UNTV. OF AM. STUD. IN 
SACRED THEOLOGY No. 84 (1944) (dissertation)). 
4. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 408 (1946) ("Moral turpitude is not 
a touchstone of taxability."), overruled on other grounds by James v. United States, 
366 U.S. 213, 220-22 (1961); Marienfeld v. United States, 214 F.2d 632, 640 (8th 
Cir. 1954) (Johnsen, J., concurring specially) ("Tax liability necessarily is an 
economic not a moral question."). 
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taxpayer's duty, independent of the law, t o  pay a specified 
amount of tax. If it were, taxpayers would have a constant duty 
to pay that amount even if Congress changed the applicable 
rates. Similarly, if a taxpayer had an inherent and constant 
duty to contribute to society, the taxpayer could satisfy the 
duty by directly contributing to public service without paying 
taxes. Likewise, a taxpayer could violate this duty by paying 
less than an inherent fair share, even though she paid what 
the law req~i red .~  
It is also tempting to propose that tax evasion and tax 
avoidance are innate. Even trivial exercise of the power t o  tax, 
whether fair or unfair, inevitably results in resistance? The 
United States, for example, enjoys an extensive tradition of 
taxpayers avoiding the tax c~llector.~ Indeed, the birth of our 
nation is founded upon the evasion of a tax exacted and 
collected through the use of stamps? This tradition of evasion 
or avoidance, whatever the motive, however, begs the inquiry 
whether there is a moral component to the evasion of taxes. 
5. Because legal rules such as tax laws are not logically deduced, Holmes 
could conclude, "the claim of our especial code to respect is simply that it exists, 
that i t  is the one to which we have become accustomed, and not that it represents 
an eternal principle." Oliver W. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 
HAW.  L. REV. 443, 460 (1899). Similarly, "rights and duties" are not eternal 
principles. As Holmes put it: 
If I . . . live with others they tell me that I must do and abstain from 
doing various things or they will put the screws on to me. I believe that 
they will, and being of the same mind as to their conduct I not only 
accept the rules but come in time to accept them with sympathy and 
emotional affirmation and begin to talk about duties and rights. But for 
legal purposes a right is only the hypostasis of a prophesy-the 
imagination of a substance supporting the fact that the public force will 
be brought to bear upon those who do things said to contravene it . . . . 
Oliver W. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HAW. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918). 
6. Doreen McBarnet defines tax resistance as an implicitly "intentional 
action," and examines compliance with tax laws as a means to escape tax liability 
without risking noncompliance. Doreen McBarnet, The Construction of Compliance 
and the Challenge for Control: The Limits of Noncompliance Research, in WHY 
PEOPLE PAY TAXES 333 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992). 
7. DALL W. FORSYTHE, TAXATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE YOUNG 
NATION 1781-1833, at  60 (1977). 
8. See CAROLYN WEBBER & AARON WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND 
EXPENDITURE I N  THE WESTERN WORLD 361-66 (1986); Robert J. Haws, A Brief 
History of American Resistance to Taxation, in INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 113 
(Phillip Sawicki ed., 1983); see also CYRIL N. PARKINSON, THE LAW AND THE 
PROFITS 22-35 (1960) (discussing the history of taxation from ancient history to the 
French Revolution). 
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Oliver Wendell Holmes' often repeated idea that the life of 
the law is not logic but experience suggests that neither tax 
evasion nor tax enforcement implicates moral  issue^.^ Holmes 
might well have agreed that, a t  least in the absence of 
independently wrongful conduct, tax code violations are merely 
manufactured economic propositions, not moral ones. 
Holmes' view was not new when announced. William 
Blackstone, whose treatise it is said topped Holmes' reading 
list,'' was of the opinion that violations of the tax law fell in 
the category of mala prohibita crimes which, by definition, 
carried no moral baggage." Blackstone went so far as to 
assert that this lack of morality within mala prohibita laws 
was not only appropriate but was inherent, for it would be "a 
very wicked thing . . . if every such law were a snare for the 
conscience of the  subject."'^^ moral consequence then would 
seem to flow from a simple act of tax evasion; in fact, evasion 
of taxes-either completely or in part-is almost a patriotic 
duty. l3 
9. In THE COMMON LAW, Holmes wrote: 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, 
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices 
which judges share with their fellow-men, have a good deal more to do 
than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be 
governed. 
O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
10. David S. Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 
11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 107 n.50 (1982). 
11. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *54-55, *57 n.42, *317. 
According to George Sharswood, an early editor of Blackstone, the criminality 
of mala prohibita violations is assessed solely by its consequences: "[Hie who saves 
a sum of money by evading the payment of a tax does exactly the same injury to 
society as he who steals so much from the treasury, and is therefore guilty of as 
great immorality, or as great an act of dishonesty." Id. at  *58 11.45 (inserting 
Sharswood's opinion). 
Another way of expressing the idea is through a neutral and definitely amoral 
view that the law simply does not require us to pay more taxes than are due. 
E.g., Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934). 
12. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *58. According to Blackstone, mala 
prohibita laws merely present an "alternative . . . [to] 'either abstain from this, or 
submit to such a penalty:' and his conscience will be clear, whichever side of the 
alternative he thinks proper to embrace." Id. 
13. Cf. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) (Hand, J.) ("Any 
one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not 
bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a 
patriotic duty to increase one's taxes."). In support of this proposition, Blackstone 
asserts that the "ill consequence" of high taxes on merchandise is that such taxes 
fall "heavier" on the consumer a t  the end of the chain of commerce and of taxation 
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If a taxpayer commits a moral wrong by violating the tax 
laws, it  is not because she pays less than the morally proper 
amount but rather because she disobeys the government. So, if 
there is a moral duty to pay taxes, it must be a duty to pay 
whatever the government demands. But what if the 
government demands ninety percent of all income? Perhaps 
there is a moral duty to pay what the government demands 
provided that the government demand is fair. Because, 
however, taxpayers would likely differ as to what is fair, even 
assuming honesty on their part, it must be in the government's 
power to determine what is fair.14 Accepting this proposition, 
if the government determines that a flat ninety percent rate is 
fair, we would need to concede a moral duty to pay ninety 
percent. l5 
If tax laws served moral purposes, tax laws would be 
appropriate as a method of punishment solely to prohibit and 
penalize conduct. l6 Retroactive tax law amendments, so-called 
"bait-and-switch taxation," would perhaps inspire more concern 
if the Supreme Court considered tax laws to be more than mere 
"economic legislation" with solely economic consequences that 
apportions "the cost of government among those who in some 
because "every trader . . . must have a profit" not only on the product itself, and 
the labor and time to "prepar[e] it, but also upon the very tax itself which [the 
trader] advances to the government." BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, a t  *317. 
14. Indeed, some taxpayers may argue no demand could ever be fair. Robert 
McGee suggests that if a "tax is extracted by force or by the threat of force, as in 
the case of the income tax, there seems to be no moral duty to give anything 
whatsoever, because the recipient is a thief." Only to the extent the amount given 
is directly proportional to the received value of services provided by the "thief," the 
government is there a moral duty to pay. Robert W. McGee, Is Tax Evasion 
Unethical?, 42 KAN. L. REV. 411, 423 (1994). Under this line of reasoning, the 
government could not fairly decide what it is due, and thus there would be no 
moral obligation to pay any amount. Not surprisingly, McGee concludes that 
taxation is theft by the state. Id. at 433-34. 
15. One could argue there is a moral obligation to pay a ninety percent tax if 
it is just and has as its object to serve the common good. However, one of the 
tests of a just law is that it has stood the test of time and has not been 
overthrown by taxpayer disobedience. The argument that a ninety percent rate is 
just and that "since . . . the state need[s] constant support, it seems reasonable to 
maintain that piety demands this support to be given by the . . . citizen," would 
undoubtedly be unpersuasive to most taxpayers. Crowe, supra note 3, at  61, 157, 
163. 
16. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994) (tax 
laws are normally to raise revenue, and a tax with the sole purpose to deter or 
exact retribution for a prohibited taxpayer conduct is inappropriate and cannot 
stand). 
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measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its 
burdens."17 
An ordinary taxpayer's response to the state's decisional 
and enforcement power-the desire to avoid a tax or an audit, 
or the good-faith or mistaken belief (due to the complexity of 
the Code) in the legality of conduct-is neither punished nor 
considered morally wrong.'' This may be explained by our 
instinctual aversion to the existence of a supposed moral duty 
to pay what the government decides is fair. Punishment is 
considered appropriate only when a taxpayer's disobedience 
amounts to  willful tax evasion. Such defiance is not a breach of 
a moral duty, but rather an affront to the existence of the 
state's power to regulate her behavior and to demand she obey 
its requirements. 
This Article discusses the classical moral justifications for 
obeying the law, and how tax laws mesh, if at all, with 
traditional notions of morality. While the proposition that 
violation of tax laws is immoral seems a t  first glance a 
simplistic notion, the discussion that ensues demonstrates that 
this apparently self-evident proposition is an uneasy one. If one 
concludes that it is not immoral to disobey just laws, it cannot 
be immoral to disobey just tax laws. As a direct consequence, 
the tax evader is not perceived as breaching a moral duty. This 
seeming absence of moral considerations implicates the 
legitimacy of the tax system; it colors perceptions of the 
criminality of tax laws; and it directly affects punishment for 
the violation of the tax laws. 
There is a widely held belief that obedience to just laws is 
moral.lg One of the earliest arguments for a moral obligation 
17. United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2023 (1994) (upholding 
retroactive taxation as "economic legislation" that, despite taxpayer reliance and 
detriment, is a reasonable attempt to prevent unanticipated revenue loss by 
denying a deduction to "purely tax-motivated" taxpayers). The "bait-and-switch" 
reference is Justice Scalia's. Id. at  2026 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
18. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991) (holding that a good- 
faith belief that one's conduct is not illegal negates willfulness); Ratzlaf v. United 
States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 663 (1994) (holding that willfulness requires that a 
taxpayer know his conduct violates the law). 
19. The relationship between law and morality has its roots in the natural 
law philosophers of ancient Greece. 
Law making is conceived as having two aspects, the selection of specific 
ends to achieve. the overriding end of the common good of all people, and 
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to obey the law was advanced by Socrates in the C r i t ~ . ~ '  
Condemned to death, Socrates refuses to escape and live in 
exile in another country because he believes he has an  
obligation to obey the laws of the state. In Socrates' view, a 
state imperils its existence if i t  allows its citizens to ignore 
either its laws or its judicial proce~s.'~ However, as is made 
plain below, it is not easy to argue that a moral obligation to 
obey the law exists. That we have a moral obligation to obey 
tax law is more tenuous still. 
Although political and legal theorists disagree about the 
basis and scope of a moral duty to obey the law, few have 
doubted that such a duty exists." At the same time, most 
would concede that the moral duty to obey the law is subject to 
conditions and exceptions: i t  is not an absolute duty.23 Despite 
near unanimous agreement as to this basic proposition, the 
debate over the relationship between moral and legal 
obligations is intense.24 
the selection of means to achieve these ends. . . . The discovery of those 
ends which are necessary for human happiness involves an analysis of 
human nature, and the ascertaining of those acts which will achieve these 
ends necessitates an analysis of the nature of the world in which we live. 
When a law is enacted in order to achieve ends necessary for human 
happiness, and the law requires acts which will achieve these ends, 
obedience to the law will be morally necessary or obligatory. A law which 
does not have such a means-end relationship is not obligatory and if it 
imposes no obligation then it is not true law. 
J.C. SMITH, LEGAL ORLIGATION 5-6 (1976). 
20. PLATo, Crito, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES (Edith Hamilton & 
Huntington Cairns eds. & Hugh Tredennik trans., 1961). 
21. See HUNTINGTON CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLAT0 TO HEGEL 54 
(1949). 
22. John Rawls has written, "I shall assume, as requiring no argument, that 
there is, a t  least in a society such as ours, a moral obligation to obey the law, 
although it may, of course, be overridden in certain cases by other more stringent 
obligations." John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 3, 3 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964); see George C. Christie, On the Moral 
Obligation to Obey the Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1311. 
23. For instance, Weiss writes: 
All disobedience to the state is justifiable so far as it is guided by 
principles and values superior to those now being illustrated or possible. 
In some cases the primary aim is to get a better functioning state, but 
one also has a right to disobey bad laws . . . because one is concerned 
, 
with other values at  least as comprehensive and vital as those that the 
state a t  its best might exhibit and promote. 
Paul Weiss, The Right to Disobey, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 101 (Sidney Hook ed., 
1964). Yet as Wolff points out, states typically claim an absolute right to command 
and require a corresponding absolute duty of citizens to obey. ROBERT P. WOLFF, 
IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970). 
24. See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, LAW AND MORALS 117 (Oxford Univ. Press 1924) 
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A. The Duty to Obey Just Laws 
If there is some moral duty to obey the law and if that  
duty is not absolute, then its proponents must  prove that  there 
is, at least, a prima facie moral duty to obey. Citizens have a 
prima facie moral obligation to obey the law if, and only if, 
their moral reason for obeying the law is stronger than a coun- 
tervailing moral reason not to obey the law. Where the moral 
reason for obeying the law is stronger, failure to obey the law 
is wrong.25 
1. Obligation based on consent 
Most arguments for a prima facie moral duty to obey the 
law are based on consent theory? Because the state of nature 
is too violent and chaotic, individuals sacrifice their autonomy 
in  a social contract through which they gain peace and securi- 
ty.27 Inasmuch as such government is always preferable to the 
(concluding that after twenty-four hundred years of philosophical and juristic 
discussion, no theory has yet been able to maintain itself); Richard Wasserstrom, 
The Obligation to Obey the Law, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 274 (Robert S. 
Summers ed., 1968) (recognizing that just as the nature and extent of one's 
obligation to obey the law demanded attention in Socrates' time, it is no less with 
us today in equally vexing and perplexing forms). 
25. M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 
YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1973). Feinberg, however, states that a 
prima facie obligation is not in every case a decisive reason [to obey the 
law], but it is always a relevant one and one which would be conclusive 
if no other relevant reason of greater strength applied to the situation. 
Thus if Jones has a prima facie obligation to do A, then he has a moral 
reason to do A which is such that unless he has a moral reason not to 
do A that is at  least as strong, then not doing A is wrong, and he has 
an actual obligation to do A. 
Joel Feinberg, Civil Disobedience in the Modern World, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 119, 
124 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 4th ed. 1991). 
26. As Greenawalt states: 
Although theories differ on exactly why promises carry moral force, prom- 
ise is widely regarded as the clearest way in which people voluntarily 
assume moral obligations. . . . [Slince both the apposite linguistic conven- 
tions and the social practice of promise keeping exist in modern society, 
the power of promises to generate moral obligations is undisputed. 
KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 64 (Tony Honor6 & Joseph 
Raz eds., 1987). 
27. According to Locke: 
[Tlhe state of nature in reality is such an intolerable one that its inhabit- 
ants, however free, are willing to quit it. . . . Men therefore agree with 
other men to unite into a community for their comfortable, safe and 
peaceable living, and when they have so consented to make one commu- 
nity a government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one 
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state of nature, individuals continue to submit to state authori- 
t ~ . ~ '  TO maintain theoretical consistency, however, consent 
theory must show that individuals' consent is voluntarily and 
intentionally given.29 Because few individuals explicitly con- 
sent to the state's authority, their tacit consent must be found 
in some voluntary conduct. 
Participation in the government through voting is often 
given as an  example of a citizen's tacit consent. However, an 
ever increasing number of citizens do not vote and those who 
do have a limited choice between a few candidates, none of 
whom can fully represent the interests and beliefs of any indi- 
viduaLsO Moreover, nowhere is it clearly understood that vot- 
body politic, in which the majority have a right to act and conclude the 
rest. 
CAIRNS, supra note 21, at 346. 
28. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 191 (2d ed. London, 
George Routledge & Sons 1887). Simmons explains the intuitive appeal of consent 
theory: 
According to any theory of rights which places at  its center the right to 
free pursuit of our life plans, only control by others that respects this 
freedom can be seen as legitimate. But the only kind of control by others 
that respects our freedom would seem to be control to which we have 
freely submitted. That is the appeal of consent theory, the view that 
political authority is morally legitimate only when its subjects freely 
choose to submit themselves to that authority. Competing theories of 
authority do not similarly respect our natural right to self government; 
for instance, if we supposed that another's wisdom, ability or divine ap- 
pointment gave him the right to control us, we would have to concede 
that we had, after all, no natural right to control our own lives. 
John Simmons, Consent, Free Choice, and Democratic Government, 18 GA. L. REV. 
791, 792 (1984). 
29. Greenawalt explains that 
whether a government was actually created by a process involving consent 
or originated through an exercise of force is not central. What counts for 
an individual is whether he or she has promised to obey; neither the 
unanimous agreement of those originally subject to the legal order nor 
the agreement of most of one's fellow citizens can obligate an individual 
who has not agreed. 
GREENAWALT, supra note 26, at  69. 
30. Simmons, supra note 28, a t  800. 
[Vloting is often a way not of consenting to something, but merely of 
expressing a preference. If the state gives a group of condemned prisoners 
the choice of execution by firing squad or by lethal injection, and all of 
them vote for the firing squad, we cannot conclude that the prisoners 
consent to being executed by firing squad. They do, of course, choose this 
option; they approve of it, but only in the sense that they prefer it to 
their other option. They consent to neither option, despising both. Voting 
for a candidate in a democratic election sometimes has a depressingly 
similar structure. 
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ing constitutes consent to the authority of the government and 
the promise to obey its laws.31 To assume that a citizen 
equates voting with an obligation to obey the law is incorrect. 
Plato and Locke, among others, found tacit consent in a 
citizens' continued residence in a state upon reaching majori- - 
This assertion, however, also poses a number of difficul- 
ties. First, the implied choice to remain is illusory. If a citizen 
was required to choose citizenship upon reaching majority, 
rarely would that choice be voluntary. For most individuals, 
emigration is not a real option.33 Because nearly all the 
world's habitable land is governed by some state, even those 
individuals with education and resources with which to make 
such a choice can only choose between existing governments. 
Such a choice is illusory. Only if citizens could choose to live 
outside any government's authority would their choice to live 
within a state amount to consent. 
Second, if the state's authority rests on adults' tacit con- 
sent, a state's authority over minors cannot be legitimate. Mi- 
nors have not freely consented but can be taxed, fined, and 
impr i~oned .~~  
Id. (emphasis added). 
31. According to Greenawalt it is not 
plausible to suppose that voting amounts to tacit consent, in the sense of 
a clear, though nonverbal, indication of an accepting attitude toward the 
government and its laws. In the United States and many other countries, 
avowed revolutionaries are permitted to vote; no one takes their efforts to 
manipulate the political processes as showing their approval of the gov- 
ernment. Ordinary citizens are not told authoritatively that voting, . . . 
counts as approval of the government and a promise to obey its laws; no 
established social convention treats voting in political elections as a signif- 
icant agreement. 
GREENAWALT, supra note 26, at 71. 
32. See Smith, supra note 25, at 960; Harry Beran, In Defense of the Consent 
Theory of Political Obligation and Authority, 87 ETHICS 260 (1977) (proposing that 
people who remain in the state accept h l l  membership in community; failure to 
recognize the duty to obey that attaches to this acceptance is negligence). 
33. David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in HUME'S MORAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 363 (Henery D. Aiken ed., 1948). Hume asked: 
Can we seriously say that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice 
to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and 
lives from day to day by the small wages which he acquires? We may as 
well assert that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the 
dominion of the master, though he was carried on board while asleep, 
and must leap into the ocean and perish the moment he leaves her. 
Id. 
34. Simmons, supra note 28, at  808. 
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Third, if citizens consent by freely choosing to remain, why 
is there no acknowledgment of the seriousness of this choice, no 
rituals or formal pledges?35 One would think that choosing 
obedience to a government and its laws would entail some type 
of official ceremony. Yet, only in the swearing in of aliens to 
the United States can this type of formal ceremony be found. 
Recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance or other school pledge can 
hardly be said to qualify. 
The reality is "[pleople stay in homelands because of lan- 
guage, culture, job, friends, and family; their inertia hardly 
indicates approval o r  acceptance of government and  law^."^" 
Those who advocate social contract theory as a moral reason 
for citizens' obedience of the laws thus fail t o  prove that an 
average citizen has given any actual or tacit consent by voting 
o r  remaining in the state upon majority. 
2. Obligation based on fairness and reciprocity 
Many theorists argue that a citizen's acceptance of the 
benefits implicitly received from living in a society generates a 
duty of fair play to fellow citizens which obligates one to  abide 
' 1 the rules of that society. As Hart explained: 
[Wlhen a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise ac- 
cording to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who 
have submitted t o  these restrictions when required have a 
right to a similar submission from those who have benefitted 
by their submission. The rules may provide that officials 
should have authority to enforce obedience and make further 
rules, and this will create a structure of legal rights and du- 
ties, but the moral obligation to obey the rules in such cir- 
cumstances is due to the co-operating members of the society, 
and they have the correlative moral right to ~bedience.~? 
- - 
35. Id. As Hume suggested: 
I t  is strange that an act of the mind, which every individual is supposed 
to have formed, and after he came to the use of reason too, otherwise it 
could have no authority-that this act, I say, should be so much unknown 
to all of them that over the face of the whole earth there scarcely remain 
any traces or memory of it. 
Hume, supra note 33, at 359. 
36. GREENAWALT, supra note 26, a t  73. 
37. H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 185 (1955) 
(first emphasis added). Rawls wrote: 
[The duty to obey the law] depends on our having accepted and our in- 
tention to continue accepting the benefits of a just scheme of cooperation 
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Like consent theory, the fairness argument has an intu- 
itive appeal: it is unfair to benefit from others' compliance 
without re~iprocating.~~ But the fairness argument suffers 
from the same problem of choice which troubles consent theory: 
most citizens cannot help but benefit from others' compliance 
and make no choice in that regard.3g In order to survive in the 
modern state, one must participate in economic activities, trav- 
el on public roads, and interact with other citizens in a myriad 
of socially regulated exchanges. Individuals have no choice but 
to live within some state and benefit from its institutions. Con- 
trary to this modern reality, the fairness argument dictates 
reciprocity only when one freely and voluntarily accepts bene- 
fits which one could have refusedO4O 
3. Rawlsian obligation 
In his later works, Rawls shifted his analysis away from 
the duty of fair play and focused instead on the natural duty of 
that the constitution defines. In this sense it depends on our own volun- 
tary acts. Again, it is an obligation owed to our fellow citizens generally: 
that is, to those who cooperate with us in the working of the constitution. 
J O H N  RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10 (1971) (emphasis added). 
38. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 27 (1965). 
39. Greenawalt notes: 
Some benefits provided by the state are accepted voluntarily; one may or 
may not use a state park or museum for which a fee is charged. Other 
benefits, such as military and general police protection, constitute public 
goods that are open, available to everyone whether they want them or 
not and regardless of their actions. Still other benefits, such as basic 
education, involve action by recipients but that action is compelled. Final- 
ly, some benefits may be refused, but the state's control over options 
leaves little real choice; people may not have to call the fire department 
when their homes are burning, but the state's monopoly over fire fighting 
forecloses other possibilities for relief. 
GREENAWALT, supra note 26, at  124-25. 
40. As Raz points out: 
[Tlhe fairness argument is of dubious validity when one has no choice but 
to accept the benefits, or even more generally, when the benefits a;e 
given to one who doesn't request them, and in circumstances which do 
not imply an understanding concerning the conditions attached to their 
donation and receipt. Besides, even where it is unfair not to reciprocate 
for services received, or not to contribute one's share to  the production of 
a good of general public value, it cannot be unfair to perform innocuous 
acts which neither harm any one, nor impede the provision of any public 
good. Many violations of law are such innocuous ads. Therefore, appeals 
to fairness can raise no general obligation to obey the law. 
Joseph Raz, The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition, 1 J. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL. 139, 152 (1984). 
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citizens to create and maintain just institutions. While Rawls 
continues to stress the duty of fair play incumbent upon those 
who derive special benefits from the political system through 
ongoing participation within it, "the most important natural 
duty is that to support and to further just institutions.'"' 
Therefore, "if the basic structure of society is just, or as just as 
it is reasonable to expect in the circumstances, everyone has a 
natural duty to do what is required of him. Each is bound irre- 
spective of his voluntary  act^.'"^ Rawls contends that no vol- 
untary acts are necessary to bind the citizen because rational 
individuals in a hypothetical original situation would volun- 
tarily agree to be bound, even if no actual agreement took 
place.43 
Rawls' theory presupposes that some existing states are, at 
least, reasonably just. Yet nearly all existing states are hierar- 
chically structured and promote the interests of advantaged 
groups a t  the expense of disadvantaged ones. Rawls acknowl- 
edges that individuals who are treated unjustly by institutions 
are not obligated to comply with those  institution^.^^ In nearly 
all existing states, then, only the privileged minority would 
have a moral duty to obey while the majority of citizens would 
be free to disregard any laws which unjustly burden them. 
Such a limited duty would in all likelihood undermine state 
authority and result in a state of anarchy. 
41. RAWLS, supra note 37, at 334. Rawls goes on to say: 
This duty has two parts: first, we are to comply with and to do our 
share in just institutions when they exist and apply to us; and second, 
we are to assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they do 
not exist, at  least when this can be done with little cost to ourselves. 
Id. See also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL IREWISM (1993). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 13. 
No society can, of course, be a scheme of cooperation which men enter 
voluntarily in a literal sense; each person finds himself placed at  birth in 
some particular position in some particular society, and the nature of this 
position materially affects his life prospects. Yet a society satisfying the 
principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a society can to being a 
voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal per- 
sons would assent to under circumstances that are fair. In a sense its 
members are autonomous and the obligations they recognize self-imposed. 
Id. 
44. Id. at 383. See also Crowe, supra note 3, at 26 (the tax system is so 
complex that inequality is practically certain, and while this injustice in apparently 
"isolated cases" does not make the tax laws entirely unjust, it is conceded that "of 
course any individual who would certainly be taxed more than his just fair share, 
would be excused from complying with the law"). 
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Furthermore, a moral duty to obey the law does not neces- 
sarily follow from a natural duty of justice: "if disobedience will 
advance justice or retard injustice, then natural justice requires 
disobedience, not ~bedience.'"~ Individuals do have a moral 
obligation to act on the doctrine of justice and this they can do 
in any number of ways whether or not they comply with social 
and political institutions. 
4. Obligation grounded in utility 
The central principle of utilitarian doctrine is that social 
good lies in whatever brings the greatest benefit to the greatest 
number. Citizens balance competing individual and societal 
interests "to determine what will promote the most good or 
lead to the most desirable  consequence^.'"^ Upon reflection, 
citizens must realize that the greatest advantages and highest 
good can necessarily be had within a ~ommunity.~' In effect, 
the morality of the law is derived from weighing the costs of 
obedience to disobedience; the law, and consequently obedience 
to the law, is morally right when it serves the needs of the 
greatest number of people.48 
45. David A.J. Richards, Conscience, Human Rights, and the Anarchist Chal- 
lenge to the Obligation to Obey the Law, 18 GA. L. REV. 771, 784 (1984). As Raz 
explains: 
The more just and valuable the law is . . . the more reason one has to 
conform to it, and the less to obey it. Since it is just, those considerations 
which establish its justice should be one's reasons for conforming with it, 
i.e., for acting as it requires. But in acting for these reasons one would 
not be obeying the law, one would not be conforming because that is 
what the law requires. Rather one would be acting on the doctrine of 
justice to which the law itself conforms. 
Raz, supra note 40, at  141. 
46. See GREENAWALT, supra note 26. 
47. See, e.g., Hume, supra note 33, at 367. 
Our primary instincts lead us either to indulge ourselves in unlimited 
freedom, or to seek dominion over others; and it is reflection only which 
engages us to sacrifice such strong passions to the interest of peace and 
public order. A small degree of experience and observation suffices to 
teach us that society cannot possibly be maintained without the authority 
of magistrates, and that this authority must soon fall into contempt 
where exact obedience is not paid to it. The observation of these general 
and obvious interests is the source of all allegiance and of that moral 
obligation which we attribute to it. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
48. See Kent Greenawalt, Promise, Benefit, and Need: Ties that Bind Us to 
the Law, 18 GA. L. REV. 727, 744 (1984). 
TAXES, MORALS, AND LEGITIMACY 
Utilitarians analyze obedience from two diverging view- 
points. Act-utilitarians focus on the individual act: "[Wlill obe- 
dience or disobedience on this particular occasion be more like- 
ly to produce desirable consequences?7749 Act-utilitarians do 
not place moral weight on the fact that a law was obeyed but 
rather on the consequence of the act and its overall good to 
society. On the other hand, rule-utilitarians hold that "an act is 
morally right if it can be justsled by a moral rule that  would 
have desirable consequences if followed. The person making a 
choice first considers desirable moral rules and then deter- 
mines which act the appropriate rule  indicate^."^^ 
The utilitarian approach fails in many ways to explain why 
citizens have a moral obligation to obey the law. First, it is too 
broad and fails to "capture the strongly held reflective moral 
attitude that good laws have a moral claim upon us that goes 
beyond the negative consequences of di~obedience."~~ Second, 
weighing the consequences of our acts to determine their future 
utility is impractical and burdensome. Finally, placing the 
public's welfare as the primary objective is contrary to human 
nature which places the interests of self, family, and loved ones 
above the interest of the state.s2 The latter argument does not 
say that utilitarianism is not a viable method for determining 
what is moral, rather it shows that even if utilitarianism indi- 
cates what is moral, people will act in a self-interested amoral 
manner. 
Brandt proposes that there is a general prima facie duty to 
obey the law because, unless individuals are convinced that 
they have such a duty, widespread, indiscriminate disobedience 
will threaten life and property.53 But Brandt assumes that 
individuals have no prior moral duty to refrain from acts which 
endanger others. Most people refrain from murder, rape, and 
theft because they believe these acts are morally wrong." 
Moreover, those who refrain from such acts only because they 
are against the law are more likely motivated by fear of pun- 
49. Id. at 745. 
50. Id. at 745-46. 
51. Id. at 749. 
52. Id. at 749-53. 
53. Richard B.. Brandt, Toward a Credible Utilitarianism, in MORALITY AND 
THE LANGUAGE OF CONDUCT 107 (Hector-Neri Casteiieda & George Nakhnikian 
eds., 1963). 
54. Smith, supra note 25.  
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ishment than by any perceived moral obligation to obey the 
law. 
Brandt writes, "it is quite clear that there is a prima facie 
obligation to do some things that would not have been had not 
the law prescribed them: for example, driving on the right-hand 
side of the road or reporting one's income to the govern- 
ment."55 This misses the point. Certainly, there is a legal obli- 
gation to obey the law, to drive on the right side of the road 
and to report one's income-not to mention the legal obligation 
to refrain from jaywalking and to pay parking meters. But to 
"prove" a moral obligation to obey by showing that there is a 
legal obligation begs the question.56 Brandt never shows why 
there is a moral obligation to obey rather than a more basic 
obligation to promote utility. 
B. The Duty to Obey Unjust Laws 
If citizens do not have an absolute or prima facie moral 
obligation to obey just laws, it  follows that their duty to obey 
unjust laws is even less obligatory5' However, democratic 
states enact laws which often prove to be unjust to some citi- 
zens within the community and these laws are nevertheless 
obeyed. The question of whether this obedience is part of a 
greater moral duty owed to the government, to the promotion 
of social utility, to fair play, or to a just society has spawned a 
55. Richard C. Brandt, Utility and the Obligation to Obey the Law, in LAW 
AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 22, at  43, 50. 
56. For diverging views on utilitarian doctrine see H.L.A. Hart, Positivism 
and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958) and Lon L. 
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 630 (1958). 
57. Bertrand Russell argued that such unjust laws are not worthy of our obe- 
dience even in a democratic society. He stated: 
There is one very large class of cases in which the law does not have the 
merit of being impartial . . . . This is when one of the disputants is the 
state. The state makes the laws and, unless there is a very vigdant pub- 
lic opinion in defence of justifiable liberties, the state will make the law 
such as suits its own convenience, which may not be what is for the 
public good. 
Bertrand Russell, A Matter of Life, partially reprinted in THE BORZOI COLLEGE 
READER 340 (Charles Muscatine & Marlene Griffith eds., 1966). 
Russell advocates disobedience as a form of protest against the state's enact- 
ment of self-beneficial, morally unsound laws because of a competing interest that 
does carry moral obligations. Russell provides the example of a citizen's right to 
disobey the law to protest against the buildup of nuclear arms. BERTRAND RUS- 
SELL, WAR CRIMES IN VIET NAM 99-100 (1967). 
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considerable amount of controversy. Perhaps the answer lies 
somewhere in the middle; that is, a citizen's obedience exempli- 
fies the inherent power of a just government to demand obedi- 
ence from its citizens. 
Legal positivists treat the validity of law and the morality 
of law as completely separate and advocate, as Socrates did, 
obedience to even unjust law. "All valid law is enacted law. So- 
called laws of nature may be standards for distinguishing good 
from bad law, but law is law, whether good or bad. I t  is the 
pedigree of a law (where it comes from) rather than its content 
(what it commands) that determines its validity."58 The 
positivist doctrine also contends that valid law regardless of its 
content "deserves our respect and general fidelity. Even if valid 
law is bad law, we have some obligation to obey it simply be- 
cause it is law."59 
Positivists advocate obedience based on the power given to 
the government to enact laws. If laws are enacted in accord 
with the rules set by the legislative body, then a law validly 
enacted demands our obedience. However, this argument goes 
too far in claiming citizens' obedience. If validly enacted leg- 
islation openly advocates the subjugation of a particular 
group's human rights, it has no moral or legal claim on our 
obedience. 
Utilitarian proponents argue that if obedience to an unjust 
law maximizes overall human welfare, then citizens have a 
moral obligation to obey. If the law is unjust for a few, but 
beneficial for the majority, a citizen has an obligation to obey 
because the utility of obedience outweighs the individual bene- 
fits gained from disobedience." The moral weight of obedience 
comes from weighing these consequences. 
As addressed earlier, however, weighing the consequences 
of obedience or disobedience is impractical and ineffective since 
it is burdensome to weigh each individual act and often the 
consequences do not really affect anyone (e.g., speeding at 
night on a long, straight stretch of deserted road). Moreover, 
when it comes to obeying a law which is unjust to an individual 
but just to the majority, the individual will generally seek to 
58. Feinberg, supra note 25, at 123 (explaining the divergent reasoning be- 
tween natural law and positivist theorists). 
59. Id. 
60. See Brandt, supra note 55, at 53-55; Sidney Hook, Law, Justice, and Obe- 
dience, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, 56, 59-60 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964). 
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promote the welfare of herself and her loved ones over the 
general welfare of society. This underscores the schizophrenia 
associated with tax avoidance. The selfishness of tax avoidance 
is promoted, even admired, despite the fact that reduction of 
tax liability harms others. 
Theorists who advocate obedience to just institutions would 
claim that if the overall governing body promotes equitable 
treatment, citizens have a moral obligation to obey even unjust 
laws. Rawls, for example, states that citizens would owe such a 
duty if the following two principles were upheld: 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most exten- 
sive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's 
advantage, and (b) attached to positions and ofices open to 
When particular legislation fails to uphold either of these prin- 
ciples then a citizen's moral obligation to obey that law endd2  
However, the enactment of unjust laws is sometimes inevitable 
even when these two conditions are met. According to Rawls: 
In practice, we must usually choose between several unjust, 
or second best, arrangements; and then we look to nonideal 
theory to find the least unjust scheme. Sometimes this 
scheme will include measures and policies that a perfectly 
just system would reject. Two wrongs can make a right in the 
sense that the best available arrangement may contain a 
balance of imperfections, an adjustment of compensating 
 injustice^.^ 
61. RAWLS, supra note 37, at  60. 
62. When the justice of the system is in question, Rawls maintains that a 
citizen should weigh the following considerations before deciding to obey or disobey: 
(1) the justness of the constitution and the possibility for reversal; (2) the depth of 
the injustice; (3) the intent of the majority who enacted the unjust law and the 
possibility of future unjust legislation; and (4) the political sociology of the situa- 
tion and whether repeal could be hoped for. When these considerations are found 
to be minimal, then a citizen loses the obligation to  obey the law because the 
system has failed to remain just. Rawls, supra note 22, a t  15. 
63. RAWLS, supra note 37, at  279. Taxpayers, however, must be wary of re- 
jecting what they believe to be unjust arrangements. According to Rawls, conscien- 
tious disobedience of tax laws is inappropriate because reasonable minds may dif- 
fer: it is never clear when such laws are unjust. Id. a t  372. Konvitz and Thoreau 
consider tax laws in the context of other social institutions and permit conscien- 
tious refusal of tax assessments to protest other state actions. Milton R. Konvitz, 
TAXES, MORALS, AND LEGITIMACY 
When it becomes necessary to enact unjust legislation, the 
moral obligation to obey derives from the duty to perpetuate 
the just institution notwithstanding the unjust law. However, it 
is questionable whether such a duty would be based on moral 
or legal obligations. I t  seems clear that when citizens are 
aware of the unjust nature of the law, if and when they obey it 
they do so more out of a sense of legal duty to maintain the 
system rather than from a sense of moral constraint. 
In fact, democratically enacted legislation often fails to 
meet Rawls' second criteria since social and economic inequali- 
ties are not distributed equitably.64 Laws are often enacted 
which favor governmental rights over individual rights and 
promote the welfare of the economically, socially, and politically 
advantaged over those who do not hold such power. Under 
these circumstances, some citizens may feel morally justified in  
di~obedience.~~ 
Disobedience of an unjust law within an  over-arching just 
political system is considered by many theorists to be a citizen's 
Civil Disobedience and th.e Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, 19, 23 
(Sidney Hook ed., 1964); HENRY D. THOREAU, Civil Disobedience, in WALDEN AND 
CML DISOBEDIENCE 235, 242 (Sherman Paul ed., 1960). 
64. For example, in Nordlinger the Supreme Court acknowledged there may 
be legitimate and rational policy reasons to deny one taxpayer a tax-connected 
benefit in favor of another taxpayer, including "local neighborhood preservation, 
continuity, and stability." Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2333 (1992) (citing 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). The Court recognized, in analyz- 
ing California's scheme of property taxation that explicitly favors long-time home- 
owners, that taxes may refled the fad  that the state finds one taxpayer's expecta- 
tions are "more deserving of protection" than another's. Id. 
Both the Nordlinger dissent and majority explicitly conceded that this system 
of taxation is discriminatory and unfair. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, referred to 
California long-time homeowners as "Squires" and said such tax law creates "a 
privilege of a medieval character: Two families with equal needs and equal resourc- 
es are treated differently solely because of their different heritage." Id. at 2342 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). But the majority allowed the taxation to go forward even 
though it characterized the tax as a "grand experiment [that] appears to vest bene- 
fits in a broad, powerhl, and entrenched segment of society, and . . . ordinary 
democratic processes may be unlikely to prompt its reconsideration or repeal." Id. 
at  2336. It seems that when it comes to taxes, the Court will not "second-guess[] 
state tax officials." Id. at  2339 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
65. For example, California's infamous Proposition 13 tax revolt was born of 
supposed inequities in the tax system. Bill Wallace, Prop. 13 Was Born of Anti-Tax 
Anger, Homeowner's Hit by Rise in Property Values, S.F. CHRON., June 19, 1992, a t  
A4. The recent Supreme Court challenge to Proposition 13 is similarly based on 
perceptions that the tax is inequitably applied. Carlyle W. Hall, Jr. & AM E. 
Carlson, California Commentary: The Supreme Court Decision Upholding Proposi- 
tion 13 Makes Reform of its Inequities Even More of a Priority, L.A. TIMES, June 
19, 1992, at  B7 (discussing need to bring the action culminating in Nordlinger). 
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moral right. However, it is also true that the state must have 
the authority to punish this form of conscientious disobedience 
since any disobedience is a threat to the stability of the sys- 
tem? By accepting punishment, the conscientious citizen can 
disobey an unjust law without undermining the state's authori- 
ty* 
The soldier commanded to fight an unjust war and the 
citizen commanded to support that war by paying taxes can 
refuse to obey in order to do right." This is so even if the laws 
governing military service and taxes are, themselves, reason- 
ably just. Thus, according to Thoreau: "It is not desirable to 
cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right."' But 
when a citizen exercises a right which undermines the power of 
the state to govern, the state will require obedience or sanction 
the protestor without explicitly recognizing the moral right to 
disobey. Further, when citizens' disobedience of the law brings 
rights into conflict (e.g., freedom of speech and assembly versus 
private property rights) the state maintains the authority to 
determine which rights take precedence, separate from any 
consideration of moral rights and obligations. 
C. The Duty to Obey Tax Laws 
The power of the state to decide and to describe those exac- 
tions its citizens must pay is among the most fundamental and 
wide-reaching powers of g~vernment.~' I t  is axiomatic that 
any government needs the financial support of its citizens, 
whether voluntarily or involuntarily obtained, to function effi- 
ciently or even to function a t  all.70 Given the vital role of tax- 
es to the perpetuation of government, Cicero aptly stated that 
66. Konvitz, supra note 63, at  27. Konvitz explains this principle by observ- 
ing: "[Tlhe individual conscience must have the last word: If that last word means 
civil disobedience, which entails the penalty of the law, then the penalty must be 
imposed, and in this way both conscience and law are vindicated." Id. 
67. THOREAU, supra note 63, a t  241-42. 
68. Id. at 236. 
69. See WEBBER & WILDAVSKY, supra note 8, at 38-147 (outlining ancient sys- 
tems of taxation); Richard Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, 4 J. SOC. PHIL. 
& POL'Y 49, 149 (1986) ("One constant refrain of political and constitutional history 
treats taxation as an inherent and indispensable power of the sovereign."). 
The United States Constitution expressly gives the Congress the "power to lay 
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1. 
70. Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 129 (1868) ("The prompt 
collection of the revenue, and its faithful application, is one of the most vital du- 
ties of government."). 
TAXES, MORALS, AND LEGITIMACY 
"[tlaxes are the sinews of the state."?' Indeed it has been ob- 
served that a "world without taxation is a world without gov- 
ernment."72 The Supreme Court from the time of McCulloch v. 
Maryland to the present has affirmed this basic governmental 
power.73 Its most recent pronouncement in Barclays Bank 
PLC v. Franchise Tax ~ o a r d ? ~  is consistent with this idea. In  
Barclays, the Court recognized that along with the broad power 
to tax comes the equally wide latitude to prevent an affront to 
this power and to "guard against" taxpayer manipulations of 
tax laws that almost avoid taxes altogether. The Court ac- 
knowledged that if upholding the state's power to tax meant 
that some taxpayers were a t  risk for or would be subject to 
71. BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL 
TAX PRACTICE vii (1981) (quote by Marcus Tullius Cicero). Cicero believed nothing 
was more noble than the law of the State. Laws were "originally made for the se- 
curity of the people, the preservation of the State, and the peace and happiness of 
human life." CAIRNS, supra note 21, a t  142. Taxes helped to achieve that level of 
security. Holmes and Brandeis expressed a similar thought: "Taxes are what we 
pay for civilized society . . . ." Compaiiia General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Col- 
lector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting). The United 
States Supreme Court in 1934 also declared that "taxes are the life-blood of gov- 
ernment." Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1934). A more recently ex- 
pressed gloss on the matter is that-"[oln the budgetary base . . . rest the political 
pillars of society." WEBRER & WILDAVSKY, supra note 8, a t  31. 
72. Epstein, supra note 69, at  49. Epstein goes on to discuss the dilemma 
presented by the apparent fact that taxation involves institutional coercion. Id. 
73. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436-37 (1819), the Su- 
preme Court held that state taxes on Bank of United States state branch opera- 
tions were unconstitutional. Chief Justice Marshall's celebrated McCulloch dictum 
about state taxation and sovereign immunity implicitly recognized the fundamental 
nature of taxation: 
That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to 
destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create; that there is 
a plain repugnance in conferring on one government a power to control 
the constitutional measures of another, which other, with respect to those 
very measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the 
control, are propositions not to be denied. 
Id. at 431. 
The basic nature of the power to tax has been widely recognized by the Court 
throughout its history. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 
U.S. 221 (1987) (deferential taxation power is a "powerhl weapon against the tax- 
payer selected"); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663 (1874) ("The 
power to tax is . . . the most pervading of all the powers of government . . . ."); 
Society for Sav. v. Coite, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 594, 606 (1867) (taxation power "resides 
in the government as a part of itself" and is "never presumed to be relinquished"); 
Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 US. (4 Pet.) 514, 563 (1830) (the power to tax 
"operates on all the persons and property belonging to  the body politic" and "has 
its foundation in society itself"). 
74. 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994). 
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"multiple taxation," so be it.75 The taxpayer is sacrificed for 
the good of "state autonomy."76 
However, the state's need for tax dollars does not necessar- 
ily coincide with a citizen's moral obligation to obey the tax 
laws. After all, a despotic regime also collects tax dollars and 
few would say that a citizen living under such a regime has a 
moral obligation to obey. Moral implications certainly result 
from the payment and use of tax revenue, but our obligation to 
obey the tax laws stems more from the power of the govern- 
ment to demand obedience, particularly through the threat of 
punishment, than from a moral duty to obey. 
1. Social contract theory and taxes 
Consent theorists argue that as part of our promise to obey 
the laws of the state, we have a moral duty to obey the tax 
laws. In exchange for supplying the state with tax dollars, a 
citizen receives the benefits of peace and security made possible 
by the maintenance of a well-functioning political body. These 
benefits are available because almost everyone obeys the law. 
Locke and others regarded this exchange as necessary for the 
welfare of both the state and its citizens. In his hypothetical 
order, Locke presumed that citizens would voluntarily enter 
into a pact to obey the government because "the use of the 
sovereign power leaves him better off than he was with his 
natural  endowment^.'"^ Voluntary compliance, however, has 
its limits. Many citizens would not voluntarily consent to the 
income tax set by the government or to the use of the dollars 
once collected. 
"Taxation is the power to coerce other individuals to sur- 
render their property without their consent."78 Epstein has 
explored the apparent paradox of taxation based on Lockean 
political theory. Lockean theory rests on the proposition that 
liberty is good and coercion is evil.7g Epstein explains the ten- 
sion between liberty and coercive taxation by claiming that 
since taxation is necessary for government to function, and 
government is necessary for an individual's well being, govern- 
ment must possess an inherent but limited power to t a d 0  
75. Id. at 2281. 
76. Id. at 2286. 
77. Epstein, supra note 69, at 53. 
78. Id.; see also McGee, supra note 14, at  411. 
79. Epstein, supra note 69, at 49. 
80. Id. at 50. Epstein argues that Locke's theory is unworkable today because 
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The security and benefits provided by the government through 
tax collection are made possible by most citizens' compliance to 
the law. 
However, under the present complex tax structure it is 
impossible to levy taxes in proportion to the benefits received 
by each citizen." Persons in the middle tax brackets pay a 
large percentage of their income into the tax coffers but receive 
fewer tax incentives than those in both the higher and lower 
income brackets. Moreover, the average citizen attempting to 
figure out the tax code encounters laws so complex that only a 
relatively small number of experts can understand them. Thus, 
only those who can afford the experts are able to take advan- 
tage of the loopholes that the laws may allow. The average 
taxpayer has not consented to such a bargain with the govern- 
ment and thus cannot break a moral obligation. 
2. Fairness, justice, reciprocity and taxes 
Perhaps a stronger argument could be made that one's 
duty to pay taxes arises out of a sense of a duty to deal justly 
and fairly with one's neighbor. The moral power of this asser- 
tion is based on the belief that tax evasion "does exploit unfair- 
ly the law-abidingness of  other^."'^ In regard to paying per- 
sonal income tax, the social consequences of one person not 
paying are unnoticeable t o  society but have a noticeable private 
gain to the individual. Rawls, however, claimed that the duty of 
fair play and the obligation to uphold just institutions bind us 
to pay the tax since we have accepted the benefits of the fiscal 
of the unequal treatment of tax laws. When special tax regulations are passed that 
benefit one group over another, all taxpayers (or citizens, etc.) are not allowed to 
share pro rata in social gain. His solution is to simplify the tax scheme by imple- 
menting flat rates and eliminating special exemptions and subsidies. At the same 
time, government must restrict the expenditure side of the budget and restrict 
direct regulation of the economy. Id. at  53-54, 67-70. 
Similarly, McGee notes two points overlooked by those who argue that coercion 
is needed to raise enough revenue in order for the government to function properly 
because voluntary tax payments would be insufficient: One, that "[flairness, equity 
and property rights are totally absent from this line of reasoning;" and two, that 
"one must still ask 'how much is necessary?' If the goal of a free society is to 
minimize coercion and allow maximum room for individual choice, then government 
expenditures must be kept to a minimum at  minimize the amount of coercion 
needed to raise funds. Thus, the role of the government must be minimized." 
McGee, supra note 14, at 431. 
81. Epstein, supra note 69, at 49. 
82. Feinberg, supra note 25, a t  129. 
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system to which the tax belongs.83 Theoretically, this is so be- 
cause the system of cooperation consistently followed by every- 
one else produces advantages generally enjoyed by all. As such, 
there is no reason to exempt any one individual since that 
would unfairly exploit the law-abidingness of others.84 
Theories of fair play and justice are supportable if benefits 
and liberties are equitably di~tributed.'~ Tax laws are, howev- 
er, discriminatory in nature and those who generally tend to 
benefit from the laws have access to tax experts who are not 
available to  the majority. A system which is not working to the 
advantage of all citizens does not create a moral obligation 
since it is not promoting the maintenance of a just institu- 
tion.'" 
Moreover, a discharge of obligation does not necessarily 
require compliance with tax laws. Individuals might discharge 
any duty of contribution by assisting directly in the provision of 
needed goods and services. Only rarely would an individual, for 
example, be obligated to contribute tax dollars to national de- 
fense? Indeed, why should tax dollars be used for govern- 
ment expenditures that do not promote the public good? In a 
complex democratic society it is impossible to pinpoint where 
tax monies are being spent, much less whether the revenue 
will promote equitable and social advantages for all. 
3. Utilitarianism and taxes 
The payment of taxes could be found morally obligatory if 
tax dollars work towards promoting the greatest good for the 
greatest number. Non-payment of taxes seems to produce a net 
83. Rawls, supra note 22, at  15-16. 
84. My colleague, William K.S. Wang, notes that this is related to the 
"commons" dilemma in which some overuse a free good or service available to all. 
He refers to Richard Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 
978 (1985) and MANAGING THE COMMONS (Garrett Hardin & John Baden eds., 
1977). 
85. See supra part 1I.A-B. 
86. See Crowe, supra note 3,  at 23. 
87. WOLFF, supra note 23, at 80. Wolff writes: 
The army itself could be run on the basis of voluntary commitments and 
submission to orders. To be sure, the day might arrive when there were 
not enough volunteers to protect the freedom and security of the society. 
But if that were the case, then it would clearly be illegitimate to com- 
mand the citizens to fight. Why should a nation continue to exist if its 
populace does not wish to defend it? 
Id. 
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loss since it reduces the amount of money available for public 
expenditures and presumably increases the burden on other 
taxpayers. But the existence and extent of the loss depend on 
how the money is used. The taxpayer benefits from underpay- 
ment if the value of the use of the money owed exceeds the 
present value of the cost of payment later (including interest 
and penalties) considering the probability of detection? Addi- 
tionally, if unpaid taxes are used by the non-payer in a way 
that benefits the public either directly or indirectly, there may 
well be a net gain t o  society. Thus, tax evasion produces a net 
loss for society only if government spending, as funded by taxa- 
tion, is the most efficient and economic use for the money?' 
If we are to judge our moral obligations by the consequenc- 
es of our payment or lack of payment of tax dollars (as the act- 
utilitarians do) then it is far from clear when payment would 
be morally obligatory and when not. In a complex society it is 
impossible to trace the government's use of those tax dollars. 
Tax money that contributes to the buildup of nuclear weapons 
is just one example where taxpayers may believe that  the con- 
sequence of paying tax dollars is immoral since there is a legiti- 
mate concern as to whether this promotes the general welfare 
of society. Tax payments based on utility clearly do not impli- 
cate moral obligations under all circumstances. 
4. Holrnesian obligation 
The "duty" to obey tax laws seems particularly amenable to 
Holmes' analysis. Holmes explains the operation of law not in 
terms of rights and duties but in terms of power: the govern- 
ment has the power to enforce laws and citizens must obey or 
suffer the penalties." At the same time, the government's 
88. The probability of detection figures heavily in the tax evader's calcula- 
tions. This idea is demonstrated easily in areas in which detection is unlikely. see 
Abt Assocs. Inc., Unreported Taxable Income from Selected Illegal Activities 62, 108, 
147 (1984) (estimating that the unreported taxable income in 1982 related to drugs 
was $22.15 billion, to gambling was $2.39 billion and to prostitution was $11.58 
billion); Commission on Taxpayer Compliance, ABA, Report and Recommendations 
on Taxpayer Compliance, 41 TAX LAW. 329, 342 (1987) (opportunity to underreport 
income without detection a major factor affecting compliance); Steven E. Crane & 
Farrokh Nourzad, Feokral Income Tax Evasion, in EXAMINATION OF BASIC WEAK- 
NESSES OF INCOME AS THE MAJOR FEDERAL TAX BASE 140, 145 (Richard W. 
Lindholm ed., 1986). Here again is the coercive nature of taxing. 
89. This proposition is defensible only so far as government provides public 
goods and services that ultimately benefit society. 
90. Holmes defines law as "a statement of the circumstances in which the 
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power has limits. If a statute is so unpopular a s  to encourage 
widespread disobedience, government power to enforce the 
statute is diminished or undone?' The law becomes "empty 
words," not through its immorality but through its perceived 
unpopularity which incites disobedience interfering with its en- 
forcement. A tax rate of 90% would be empty words whether or 
not it was wrong because taxpayer disobedience would render 
it unenforceable. Thus, a tax rate which is fair could be said to 
implicate moral obligations whereas an obviously unfair tax 
rate would not.92 Many tax rates, however, fall in the middle, 
making taxpayers feel they are being taxed too much but still 
feel they should pay some. Taxpayers ease this burden by al- 
most instinctual minimization efforts, not by dis~bedience?~ 
To be effective, the law must, to some extent, respect the 
"instincts" of its  subject^.'^ Perhaps the deepest human in- 
stinct is "a justifiable self-preference." Thus, the government 
accepts taxpayers' self-interested attempts to minimize tax 
public force will be brought to bear upon men through the courts . . . ." Letter 
from Oliver Wendell Holrnes to Frederick Pollock (January 19, 1928), in THE ES- 
SENTIAL HOLMES 179 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992). Thus, it is the fear of punish- 
ment, the power of the courts to sanction behavior, that spurs many people to obey 
the law. 
91. "I once heard the late Professor Agassiz say that a German population 
would rise if you added two cents to the price of a glass of beer. A statute in such 
a case would be empty words, not because it was wrong, but because it could not 
be enforced." Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460 
(1897). McGee takes the position that simply because a majority of taxpayers, ap- 
proaching one hundred percent, thinks that something is just does not make it 
just. The vast majority of people in the pre-Civil War southern United States 
thought that slavery was just, and even in keeping with God's law. Even many 
slaves did not think slavery was unjust. What they thought, however, has nothing 
to do with the justice of the matter. Justice does not depend on opinion or on a 
majority vote. McGee, supra note 14, at 416 11.32. 
92. As Plato observed, "Where there is an income tax, the just man will pay 
more, and the unjust less." WOLFMAN & HOLDEN, supra note 71, at  vii (quoting 
Plato). 
93. Indeed, the Court recently recognized and sanctioned this taxpayer in- 
stinct to ease the impact of tax burdens in Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 
655 (1994). The Ratzlaf majority's example of taxpayer maneuvers to avoid IRS 
audits or fi taxes to demonstrate legitimate tax avoidance lends credence to the 
suggestion that structuring transactions in order to avoid certain tax consequences 
is virtually an American tradition and usually is not considered criminal. See Stan- 
ley S. Arkin, 'Ratzlaf' and the Meaning of Willfulness, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 10, 1994, at 
6. 
94. For example the law recognizes property rights arising in adverse pos- 
session because "[a] thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a 
long time, whether property or opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be 
torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however 
you came by it." Holmes, supra note 91, at  477. 
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liability: the Internal Revenue Service does not demand that 
individuals pay all their income as taxes or that individuals 
structure their affairs so as to maximize tax liability. However, 
"[ilf a man is on a plank in the deep sea which will only float 
one, and a stranger lays hold of it, he will thrust him off if he 
can. When the state finds itself in a similar position, i t  does the 
same thing.'45 Despite the government's ambivalence toward 
tax avoidance, if its authority or very existence is threatened 
by overzealous minimization efforts, it figuratively thrusts the 
taxpayer off the plank. While legal tax avoidance and illegal 
tax evasion are sometimes morally indistinguishable, the gov- 
ernment draws the line to protect itself while respecting 
individuals' instincts for self preservation. Morality then plays 
little, if any, role in tax evasion; rather the driving force is the 
basic economic behavior of maximizing benefits.g6 
Holmes' ideas suggest that, a t  least absent independently 
wrong conduct, tax evasion and enforcement do not implicate 
moral issues. Rather, they reflect economic choices by individu- 
als to risk penalties and by government to enforce penalties 
while accommodating b*oth individuals' and the state's instincts 
for self-preservation. As long as taxpayers otherwise intend to 
obey the law, tax evasion is a morally neutral economic propo- 
sition. 
111. TAX MORALITY AND TAX COLLECTION 
The relevance of morality to tax collection is more than an  
academic exercise inasmuch as morality figures prominently in 
the government's effort to curtail tax avoidance. When a tax- 
payer perceives that disobedience is morally wrong, she is more 
likely to comply with the tax laws. Compliance is the most 
effective method for insuring adequate tax collection and is less 
95. HOLMES, supra note 9, at 44. 
96. In support of this proposition, it has been said that "it is embedded in 
our culture, particularly as regards financial and tax-related regulations, that if one 
can arrange one's affairs so as not to implicate a rule that one wishes to avoid, 
that one has done no moral wrong." David Spears & Linda Imes, Structuring Case 
Tests Meaning of Willfully,' N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1993, 2-4. (quoting Brief for Defen- 
dant-petitioner at 27, Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at  655); see also Leo P.  Martinez, Federal 
Tax Amnesty: Crime and Punishment Revisited, 10 VA.  TAX REV. 535, 540, 578 
(1991) (taxpayers are usually economically motivated to evade their tax obligations, 
and many "engage in a sophisticated cost-benefit analysis and conclude that the 
monetary rewards of avoiding tax obligations outweigh the potential cost of detec- 
tion"). 
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costly than any deterrence method.g7 Moral obligations, how- 
ever, have not been found to be the primary reason that citi- 
zens pay their taxes; the power of the government and the 
threat of sanctions are much more effective in producing corn- 
p l i a n ~ e . ~ ~  As much as the government would like to instill a 
sense of moral obligation to fully obey the tax laws, many citi- 
zens do not associate morality with taxes and often cheat on 
their tax payments.gg Because of the ongoing trend to avoid 
the payment of taxes, two important considerations must be 
addressed regarding the enforcement of tax laws: first the in- 
tersection of morality and punishment and second the intersec- 
tion of morality and criminality. 
A. Tax Morality and Punishment 
On the one hand, perceptions that the present system of 
taxation is fundamentally unfair are cited as a root cause of 
avoidance of tax  obligation^.'^^ On the other hand, lawmakers 
emphasize that fair astribution of the tax burden is a central 
concern in  the enactment of tax legi~lation.'~' The percep- 
tions of unfairness, however, overshadow any moral obligations 
taxpayers may feel they owe to the government and may per- 
petuate noncompliance with tax laws. The competing percep- 
97. Eugene Bardach, Moral Suasion and Taxpayer Compliance, 11 LAW & 
POLV 49 (1989). Bardach explains that moral rules are economic means of securing 
the benefits of cooperative action. Compliance based on morality would "(1) supple- 
ment the reach of legal enforcement, and (2) hold down the various costs-in audi- 
tors, private record-keeping, and intrusions on privacy-that legal enforcement 
machinery imposes on society." Id. a t  54. 
98. See id. a t  62; Walter T. Henderson, Comment, Criminal Liability Under 
the Internal Revenue Code: A Proposal to Make the "Voluntary" Compliance System 
a Little Less "Voluntary", 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1429 (1992). But see James P.F. 
Gordon, Individual Morality and Reputation Costs as  Deterrents to Tax Evasion, 33 
EUR. ECON. REV. 797, 798 (1989) (arguing that tax evasion might "induce anxiety, 
guilt, or a reduction of self-image"). 
99. Bardach, supra note 97, at 49. 
100. See GERALD CARSON, THE GOLDEN EGG 13-14 (1977); Walter J. Bium & 
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progessive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 
417 (1952); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE 
L.J. 259 (1983); Stanley Surrey, Taxes Are a Moral Issue, SAT. REV., Oct. 21, 1972, 
a t  52. 
101. See, e.g., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, H.R. 
CONF. REP. NO. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1986) (primary objective is to ensure 
that individuals with similar income pay similar amounts of tax); SENATE FINANCE 
COMM. REPORT ON THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, S. 
REP. NO. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1982) (Act is designed to improve tax equi- 
ty). 
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tions of fairness in the tax laws are an important starting point 
in analyzing the punishment of tax violators. 
Fairness remains fundamental to the formulation and 
administration of federal tax policy.lo2 Indeed, a postulate of 
any system of taxation is that the burden of paying the tax 
should be borne equally, or that the burden should a t  least be 
levied in a consistent and rational fashion.lo3 
The tax system in the United States is a major vehicle of 
social and economic policy.lo4 The tax system exists to raise 
revenue and to ensure stable economic growth while maintain- 
ing vertical equity (distributing the incidence of tax fairly by 
income classes) and horizontal equity (treating those in similar 
economic circumstances equally).lo5 Allowing taxpayers to es- 
102. The primacy of both fairness and utility is underscored by a recent In- 
ternal Revenue Service study of reform of the penalty system. EXECUTIVE TASK 
FORCE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, REPORT ON CML TAX PENALTIES, ch. 111, at 3- 
4 (1989). The IRS labels the two components fairness and effectiveness, but the 
thrust of the effectiveness study is essentially utilitarian. Professor, now Judge, 
Sneed theorized that the two dominant criteria of federal tax policy are equity and 
practicality. Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. 
L. REV. 567, 601 (1965). 
103. See Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1920); Tappan v. Merchants' 
Nat'l Bank, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 490, 504 (1873); Morton Salt Co. v. City of S. 
Hutchinson, 159 F.2d 897, 901 (10th Cir. 1947); NEIL H. JACOBY, GUIDELINES OF 
INCOME TAX REFORM FOR THE 19607S, 1 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM, HOUSE COMM. 
ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 157, 158-60 (Comm. Print 1959); 
Sneed, supra note 102, at 567. 
The Constitution prohibits direct taxes unless such taxes are levied in propor- 
tion to the populations of the states. U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 9, cl. 4. The second 
United States federal income tax was held unconstitutional because, as a direct 
tax, it was not levied in proportion to the states' populations. Pollack v. Farmers 
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), on reh'g 158 U.S. 601 (1895). The constitu- 
tional prohibition against disproportional direct taxes apparently had its genesis in 
the concern that the levy of taxes be fair and consistent. See Pollack, 157 U.S. a t  
553-586, 158 U.S. at  617-637. Of course, the Sixteenth Amendment overrules the 
result in Pollack by expressly providing for an income tax despite the Section 9 
prohibition. Pennsylvania Mut. Indem. Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 16, 19-20 (3d 
Cir. 1960). 
The Constitution requires that "all duties, impost and excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, 8 8, cl. 1. Literally absent 
from this uniformity requirement is the power to lay and collect taxes other than 
the indicated duties, imposts and excises. Despite the possibility that this apparent 
omission suggests inequity or unfairness, the Supreme Court has held that this 
omission is a recognition that as long as taxes are geographically uniform they 
may apply to particular individuals in a non-uniform manner. Knowlton v. Moore, 
178 U.S. 41, 83-109 (1900); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSI'ITUTION- 
AL LAW 245 (1977); PARKINSON, supra note 8, at  45-46. 
104. JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5 (5th ed. 1987); see also Stan- 
ley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A 
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705 (1970). 
105. PECHMAN, supra note 104, at  2; see J.F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVEL- 
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cape liability for tax evasion would seem to do little to advance 
equity.lo6 
However, if tax evaders commit no moral wrong, one might 
suppose that punishment is inappropriate. It should suffice 
that the violator pay the tax owed, perhaps with interest and 
the government's enforcement costs. But Holmes' whole point is 
that moral duties do not necessarily coincide with legal ones, 
and legal rules need no moral justification. Thus, the law may 
punish individuals who commit no moral wrong if for no other 
reason than to avoid the social ills of private retribution.lo7 
A primary reason for enacting fair tax legislation is that it 
promotes in the taxpayer a perception that obedience of the tax 
laws, as well as punishment for violation of the tax laws, is 
morally grounded. This perception facilitates tax ~ollection. '~~ 
Thus, it follows that where there is perceived inconsistency or 
unfairness in the system, the public's reaction is strongly nega- 
tive.log Fairness is essential to the system because it increas- 
es taxpayer morale and enhances voluntary c~mpliance."~ 
This is shown in the system of criminal and civil penalties-the 
primary method of enforcement of the tax laws. Tax penalties 
are said to establish the fairness of the tax system by giving 
the noncompliant taxpayer what she deserves."' To the ex- 
OPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 31 (1985). 
106. See John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in JEREMY BENTHAM & JOHN STU- 
ART MILL, THE UTILITARIANS 446, 448-470 (1961) ("The precept of returning good 
for evil has never been regarded as  a case of the hlfillment of justice . . . ."). 
107. HOLMES, supra note 9, at 41-42. 
108. Chief Justice Marshall was of the opinion that the power to tax required 
popular confidence that it would not be abused. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). 
109. Edmund Burke once noted that "[tlo tax and to please, no more than to 
love and be wise, is not given to men." Burke quoted in WEBBER & WILDAVSKY, 
supra note 8, at 1. 
110. See Jonathon S k i ~ e r  & Joel Slemrod, An Economic Perspective on Tax 
Evasion, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 345, 348-349 (1985); EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE, supra note 
102, ch. 11, a t  2-3 (1989). 
Even when the system is fair, the power to tax inevitably results in resistance. 
George Guttman, IRS Tax Amnesty, 22 TAX NOTES 1361 (March 26, 1984). This 
resistance has led some to suggest that "[aln across the board attack on the bud- 
getary base is equivalent to revolution." WEBBER & WILDAVSKY, supra note 8, at 
31. Notwithstanding (or perhaps by reason of) the revolutionary aspect of resis- 
tance to taxation, the United States enjoys an extensive tradition of avoiding the 
tax collector. FORSYTHE, supra note 7, at 60; Haws, supra note 8, a t  113; PARKIN- 
SON, supra note 8, a t  22-35. Of course, one person's perception of tax equity is 
another's unfairness or inconsistency. See Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes" 
and Political Rhetoric, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1099 (1973). 
111. EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE, supra note 102, ch. 111, a t  2; MICHAEL I. 
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tent that this retributive component of punishment is fair, the 
tax laws are fair. 
Blackstone's commentary on taxation also appears to sup- 
port the proposition that public perception of the government's 
power to tax bears vitally upon the power to enforce such tax- 
es."' A retail or consumption tax, called an excise duty, was 
the most economical form of levying taxes and consequently 
resulted in lower prices than customs taxes. But, as Blackstone 
explained, the "rigor and arbitrary proceedings" in the case of 
tax law violations caused the tax to be so extremely unpopular 
that mere rumor of such a tax was dismissed by pundits as an 
outrageous sham. l3 
However, when the tax was levied gradually, the public 
became used to and accepted it; as the tax became more expan- 
sive, it was in turn necessary to gain public approval by allow- 
ing the public to become accustomed to it and accept it.ll4 In 
contrast, the public embraced a tax connected to the post office 
with "cheerfulness, as, instead of being a burden, i t  is a mani- 
fest advantage to the public," because in return for their tax 
dollars, the public gained an efficient mail system. Taking a 
demonstrably utilitarian o r  consent theory approach to taxa- 
tion, Blackstone said: 
There cannot be devised a more eligible method than this of 
raising money upon the subject: for therein both the govern- 
ment and the people find mutual benefit. The government 
acquires a large revenue; and the people do their business 
with greater ease, expedition, and cheapness, than they would 
be able to do if no such tax (and of course no such office) 
existed.'15 
Holmes' take was that the government had no legitimate 
interest in retribution absent public outrage.ll6 The tax crimi- 
SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ql 12.01 (2d ed. 1991). 
112. According to Blackstone, municipal law is the "rule of civil conduct pre- 
scribed by the supreme power in a state . . . commanding what is right, and pro- 
hibiting what is wrong," and one of its purposes is to define and lay down these 
rights and wrongs of society. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at  *53-55 (emphasis omit- 
ted). Thus, "in things naturally indifferent, the very essence of right and wrong 
depends upon the direction of the laws to do or to omit them." Id. at  *55. 
113. Id. at *318-19 (citing Corn. Jur., Oct. 8, 1642). 
114. Id. at *319-20 (citing Corn. Jur., Oct. 8, 1642). 
115. Id. at *321-23. 
116. Holmes wrote: 
552 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
nal should be punished only if the punishment expresses the 
outrage of the community.117 This presents a unique dilemma 
in the tax context as the public might feel more sympathy to- 
ward the defendant than outrage, especially if the defendant is 
a working person of modest means.''' Nevertheless, punish- 
ment of tax evaders may still be justified as necessary to deter 
the individual and others from future evasion. Unfortunately, 
deterrence is more complex because conduct may be legal one 
day and illegal the next.llg Moreover, the taxpayer's motive of 
minimizing tax liability does not make otherwise legal conduct 
illegal. 
The more interesting question is whether deliberate or 
fraudulent evasion is morally wrong. Some of Holmes' com- 
ments about tort and criminal law might suggest that there is 
no independently wrongful conduct which transforms tax eva- 
sion into morally wrong conduct. 120 Holmes never denies that 
[Ilf the wrong . . . consisted of a breach of the revenue laws, and the 
government had been indemnified for the loss, we should [not] feel any 
internal necessity that a man who had thoroughly repented of his wrong 
should be punished for it, except on the ground that his act was known 
to others. If it was known, the law would have to verify its threats in 
order that others might believe and tremble. But if the fact was a secret 
between the sovereign and the subject, the sovereign, if wholly free from 
passion, would undoubtedly see that punishment in such a case was 
wholly without justification. 
HOLMES, supra note 9, at 46. 
117. See Leslie E. John, Note, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive 
Damages in the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2033, 2039 
(1986) (punitive damages justified as expression of community outrage). 
118. The public might feel outrage toward a high-income taxpayer who engages 
in perfectly legal avoidance schemes, especially since opportunities for tax avoid- 
ance increase with income. See, e-g., United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71 (2d 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1162 (1992), aff'd, 985 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir. 1993). 
119. This overstates the case. Obviously, a large part of the tax system is 
designed to encourage or discourage particular kinds of conduct whether econom- 
ically motivated or not. 
120. Thus, "a legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man 
does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judg- 
ment of the court . . . ." Holmes, supra note 91, at  458; BLACKSTONE, supra note 
2, at *58 (a mala prohibita violation is not "intrinsically wrong" in that mala pro- 
hibita laws "do not make the transgression a moral offense, or sin: the only obliga- 
tion in conscience is to submit to the penalty, if levied," contrary to "disobedience 
to the law involv[ing] in it any degree of public mischief or private injury" which 
constitutes "an offense against conscience"); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 
(1991) (sincere belief, or mistaken belief due to the complexity of the Code, that 
one's conduct is not illegal is not an actionable offense, whereas a belief, formed 
after a presumably careful and thorough study, that tax laws are unconstitutional, 
thus invalid, is actionable as willful tax evasion). 
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moral duties exist, nor does he suggest what they might be. 
Rather he asks that we clearly distinguish between moral and 
legal duties. When studying the law, he asks us "for the mo- 
ment to imagine [ourselves] indifferent to other and greater 
things."lzl Whether those other and greater things include 
moral duties to pay taxes, to tell the truth or to keep our prom- 
ises, Holmes does not say. 
B. Tax Morality and Criminality 
The question unanswered by Holmes is answered in part 
by the unique standard describing the mens rea required for 
conviction of tax crimes.122 One starting point is the classic 
distinction between crimes nala in se and mala prohibita.lZ3 
Mala in se crimes are immoral independent of the law (i.e., 
murder, rape, arson) and carry harsh criminal penal tie^.'^^ 
Mala prohibita offenses are petty, public welfare offenses that 
are not intrinsically wrong and which carry lesser criminal 
penalties.lz5 According to Blackstone, municipal laws sanction 
mala prohibita crimes, which are "[clrimes because forbidden," 
and consist of "things in themselves indifferent . . . either right 
or wrong, just or unjust, duties or misdemeanors, according as 
the municipal legislature sees proper . . . The slight pen- 
alties associated with violation of mala prohibita crimes also 
justify a simple resolution system and even warrant suspension 
of procedural safeguards.'" Strict liability is acceptable in 
121. Holmes, supra note 91, at  459. 
122. Civil tax fraud differs in significant part in the lower standard of proof 
required and in the lesser consequence of violation (primarily avoiding imprison- 
ment). SALTZMAN, supra note 111, 'jql 7B.01131 (standard of proof), 7B.07[11 (civil 
penalties). 
123. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL AW 338 (2d ed. 1960). 
124. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AIJTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 245 
(1979). Blackstone's formulation is similar. Natural laws and duties, and crimes 
mala in se which are "[clrimes in themselves," carry "no additional turpitude from 
being declared unlawhl by the inferior legislature." BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, a t  
*54, *57 11.41. 
125. HALL, supra note 123, at  339-40. Professor Hall makes the point that the 
gravity of criminal harm can vary either according to the effect on the victim (e.g., 
a battery is less serious than death) or according to moral culpability (e.g., an 
unintentional killing is less serious than murder). Id. a t  216-17. 
126. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *54-55, *57 n.42; Crowe, supra note 3, a t  
98 (enacted laws are concerned with matters inherently "harmful" or "beneficial," 
and inherently "indifferent to the common good"). 
127. HALL, supra note 123, at 342. 
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such circumstances because regulation is in order, but criminal 
liability is not. 12' 
The difficulty in applying this principle to the obedience or 
disobedience of tax laws is that the mala in selmala prohibita 
distinction may not be up to the task of dealing substantively 
with tax evasion. At the same time, conviction of tax crimes 
can carry substantial penalties, including imprisonment, that 
correlate to mala in se offenses.129 This is no accident. Obedi- 
ence to these mala prohibita laws is not achieved through re- 
ward or apparently any sense of moral duty, but rather 
through punishment. As Blackstone intuited, 'We must there- 
for observe, that the main strength and force of law consists in 
the penalty annexed to it."lso The lack of moral component 
makes conduct tending to tax evasion almost acceptable. 
Blackstone would probably agree that because there is no 
moral component in mala prohibita acts, such acts are not 
"intrinsically wrong," and an individual may perform the act so 
long as she pays the penalty.13' Indeed, Blackstone asserts 
that 
128. Id.; JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 156-57 (1974); 
see also Timothy Lynch, The Failure of a Flawed Maim,  THE RECORDER, April 6, 
1994, a t  10 (strict liability for mala prohibita crimes is inappropriate since knowl- 
edge and diligence defenses are then rendered irrelevant, thus "it is vitally impor- 
tant for the government to draw a bright line around activity that is illegal simply 
because the government makes it illegal. If the government communicates the 
scope of its laws clearly and effectively, the individuals who sit in the jury box 
will exercise their common sense about claims of ignorance"). 
129. Criminal tax evasion carries a penalty for individuals which includes a 
fine not more than $100,000 and imprisonment for not longer than five years. 
I.R.C. $ 7201 (1988). See Henderson, supra note 98, at  1429. 
Interestingly, the government's recent attempt to distinguish a structuring 
statute that prohibits breaking up a single transaction to avoid a bank's reporting 
requirement from a tax statute may exemplifj. the powerful effect of our seeming 
acceptance of conduct tending t o  tax evasion. Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 
655, 657 (1994) (citing 31 U.S.C.S. $ 5324). In Ratzlaf, the government claimed 
that unlike structuring, tax statutes manifest only that "Congress has merely 
drawn a line that one is forbidden to overstep but that one is allowed and even 
encouraged to come near." Criminal Law and Procedure: Currency Transactions; 
Structuring Transactions to Prevent Filing of Report; Mental Element of Offense, 62 
U.S.L.W. 3365, 3367 (Nov. 30, 1993) [hereinafter Currency Transactions]. Moreover, 
the government contended, "in contrast to tax cases, this is not one in which com- 
ing near the line can be defended as socially beneficial conduct." Id. 
130. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *57. 
131. Id. at *57-58; see also Crowe, supra note 3, at 83 ("[Clertain laws contain- 
ing a penalty do not oblige the subjects under pain of sin to anything except unre- 
sisting submission to the justly inflicted penalty."). 
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these prohibitory laws do not make the transgression a moral 
offense, or sin: the only obligation in conscience is to submit 
to the penalty, if levied . . . . But where disobedience to the 
law involves in i t  any degree of public mischief or private 
injury, there i t  falls within our former distinction, and is also 
an offense against cons~ience. '~~ 
As such, penalties take on added importance in securing 
enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code.133 Blackstone 
notes the irony of this lack of moral component within mala 
prohibita tax laws as he links the absence of morality to the 
need for unusually harsh punishment in order to enforce tax 
laws. For example, Blackstone explains that  when a tax, and 
consequently, the price of an  item, was perceived "too heavy," 
trade suffered and the tax was evaded? "Recourse must 
132. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at  *58. The opinion of George Sharswood, a 
previous Blackstone editor, is that criminality of positive law violations 
can only be measured by their consequences; and he who saves a sum 
of money by evading the payment of a tax does exactly the same 
injury to society as he who steals so much from the treasury, and is 
therefore guilty of as great immorality, or as great an act of dishon- 
esty. 
Id. a t  *58 11.45. This assertion echoes that of St. Anthony who claimed those who 
"use fraud and other means to evade taxes . . . sin mortally by committing the sin 
of theft." Crowe, supra note 3, at 42 (quoting ST. ANTONIUS, SUMMA SACRAE 
THEOLOGIAE 63 (1571)). 
Sharswood believes every individual has a moral obligation to obey her 
community's laws, and that the "breach of any known law is a violation of that 
obligation." BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at  *58 11.45. However, in accord with the 
Court in Ratzlaf and Cheek, Sharswood acknowledges that the element of willful- 
ness is an  important factor: 
[Ignorance of the law, excuses no one,] yet it is different in for0 conscien- 
tiae . . . . [Ilf the subject knows, or ought to know, the law, if he had 
exercised ordinary diligence, he has no right to set up his own judgment 
as to the indifference of the action which the legislature has prohibited or 
enjoined. 
Id.; see also Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 663 ("ignorance of the law is generally no de- 
fense to a criminal charge," but knowledge of the illegality of one's a d s  is neces- 
sary to prove willfulness); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 205 (1991). 
133. See ANDENAES, supra note 128, at  46; RAZ, supra note 124, at 246-47. 
134. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at  *317. Blackstone observed that "especially 
when the value of the commodity bears little or no proportion to the quantity of 
the 
Id. 
duty imposed," smuggling arises 
and its natural and most reasonable punishment, viz. confiscation of the 
commodity, is in such cases quite ineffectual; the intrinsic value of the 
goods, which is all that the smuggler has paid, and therefore all that he 
can lose, being very inconsiderable when compared to his prospect of 
advantage in evading the duty. 
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therefore be had to extraordinary punishments to prevent it 
[smuggling to evade taxes], perhaps even to capital ones; which 
destroys all proportion of punishment, and puts murderers 
upon an equal footing with such as are really guilty of no natu- 
ral, but merely a positive, offense."'" 
The Internal Revenue Code embodies the essence of mala 
prohibita crimes. As stated earlier, tax evasion falls into the 
class of public welfare offenses because there is no a priori duty 
to pay taxes.136 Even theorists who assume a moral duty to 
obey these mala prohibita laws admit that a t  times the moral 
aspect is of "trifling weight".137 To avoid this classification, 
some have suggested a dual component of morality requiring 
violation of an obligation to be both seriously wrong and to 
worsen an act which is already wrong on other grounds.138 
According to these views, running a stop sign a t  two o'clock in 
the morning with no one near is not morally wrong inasmuch 
as it does not break a promise, harm anyone, or create a chain 
reaction of copy-cats that would threaten an increase in disobe- 
dience.lsg Thus depending on the circumstances surrounding 
135. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at  *317 (citing MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF 
LAWS bk. 13, ch. 8 (1748)). 
136. See supra part I. 
137. See Smith, supra note 25, at 971 (if no serious instance of wrongdoing, 
then any prima facie obligation to obey is at most of trifling weight); but see 
Christie, supra note 22, at  1331 (one cannot conclude no moral obligation exists on 
grounds that law breaking has trivial consequences). 
138. Smith, supra note 25, a t  970. Smith suggests two principles which should 
govern the weight of prima facie 
obligations: 
First, that a prima facie obligation is a serious one if, and only if, an act 
which violates that obligation and fulfills no other is seriously wrong; and 
second, that a prima facie obligation is a serious one if, and only if, vio- 
lation of it will make considerably worse an act which on other grounds 
is already wrong. 
Id. 
139. See, e.g., id. at  971. Smith applies these principles to the prima facie 
obligation to obey the law: 
As for the first test, let us assume that while driving home at two o'clock 
in the morning I run a stop sign. There is no danger, for I can see clear- 
ly that there was no one approaching the intersection, nor is there any 
impressionable youth nearby t o  be inspired to a life of crime by my flout- 
ing of the traffic code. Finally, we may assume that I nevertheless had 
no specific prima facie obligation to run the stop sign. If, then, my prima 
facie obligation to obey the law is of substantial moral weight, my action 
must have been a fairly serious instance of wrongdoing. But clearly it 
was not. If it was wrong at  all-and to me this seems dubioueit  was a t  
most a mere peccadillo. As for the second test, we may observe that ads  
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the harm, a mala prohibita act that may be immoral in one 
context is not necessarily immoral when the surrounding cir- 
cumstances are changed. Moral overtones vary with the situa- 
tion, often attaching to what is mandated by law. Because 
speeding on an open road does not c a r r y  the potential for obvi- 
ous harm to others it is not in itself an immoral act. Similarly, 
even though it is harming one person, killing a tyrant would 
not necessarily be immoral because of its overall benefit to the 
community at  large.l4' In effect, breaking the law under 
these or like circumstances does not cany any moral over- 
tones. 141 
The astute reader will realize the weakness of this argu- 
ment. I t  requires no great effort to document the "harm" caused 
by wholesale tax evasion. Kant realized that wholesale tax 
evasion "could occasion general refract~riness."'~~ At the 
same time, Kant also recognized that tax evasion is not nec- 
which are otherwise wrong are not made more so-if they are made 
worse at  all-by being illegal. If I defraud someone my act is hardly 
worse morally by being illegal than it would have been were it protected 
by some legal loophole. 
Id. 
140. HALL, supra note 123, at  340. The laws of the state seek to protect its 
citizens against harm, but punishment varies according to the seriousness of the 
harm and its overall effect on the community. As Hall suggests: 
Criminal harms differ in gravity, first, because of the differential external 
effect upon the victim and the community, e.g. a battery is obviously less 
serious than a death; and secondly, by reference to the degree of moral 
culpability of the offender, e.g. a death caused by a motorist's reckless 
driving is a less serious harm than a death caused by a deliberate mur- 
derer. 
Id. at 216-17. 
141. See William K.S. Wang, The Metaphysics of Punishment-An Exercise in 
Futility, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 306, 316-17 (1976). Wasserstrom argues that 
even if it is correct that acting illegally logically implies acting prima 
facie immorally, this in no way shows that people may not often be mor- 
ally justified in acting illegally. At most, it demands that they have some 
good reason for acting illegally; a t  best, i t  requires what has already been 
hypothesized, namely, that the adion in question, while illegal, be morally 
justified. 
Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Obligation to Obey the Law, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 780, 
790 (1963). 
Blackstone clearly states that only in natural duties and mala in se crimes 
does conscience play any part. In contrast, laws which sanction "positive duties, 
and forbid only such things as are . . . mala prohibita," have no "intermixture of 
moral guilt . . . [and] conscience is no farther concerned." BLACKSTONE, supra note 
2, at *57-58. 
142. Thomas C. Grey, Serpents and Doves: A Note on Kantian h g a l  Theory, 
87 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 586 11.36 (1987). 
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essarily "unvirtu~us."'~~ That is, violation of tax laws, despite 
the effect on the state's revenues, is not inherently wrong. The 
resulting "harm" is thus, in a sense, a state manufactured 
harm. 
Any suggestion that there is an inherent moral duty to 
obey the law is both counterproductive and superfluous. It is 
counterproductive because it purports to  release individuals 
from duties of conscience: as long as they comply with the let- 
ter of the law, they may pursue self interest without consider- 
ing any burdens they impose on others. Government is left 
with the ungainly and constant task of searching for and clos- 
ing all loopholes. The duty is superfluous because individuals 
have specific moral duties to act justly-to refrain from acts 
which harm others-whenever feasible. Acts which harm others 
are immoral whether or not they are illegal; acts which do not 
harm others do not become immoral when made illegal. Where 
"harm" is diffuse and those that are harmed are numerous, 
none may have adequate incentive to pursue claims and may 
thus have given in to a "rational apathy."144 Moreover, to de- 
fine "harm" in the tax context erroneously attributes an inher- 
ent immorality to failure to pay taxes. 
Mala in se crimes, however, are founded on the basis of 
harm to  others.145 The harm resulting from tax law violations 
is often uncertain. One view, founded primarily on the utilitari- 
an theory, holds that each individual has a moral duty to con- 
tribute to the welfare of others.146 Those who believe tax eva- 
sion is immoral assume it results in economic loss to other 
taxpayers and the state.14? The countervailing view is that 
society is well served by allowing tax evaders to continue evad- 
ing taxes because such activity is wealth-generating and stimu- 
lates the economy.148 
143. Id. 
144. Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead 
Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 29 n.110 (1992). 
145. HALL, supra note 123, at 213. Harm is the foundation of criminal con- 
duct. Id. See also Smith, supra note 25, at 972. 
146. RAZ, supra note 124, at 24. 
147. K.D. Deane, Law, Morality, and Tax Euasion, 13 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1984). 
148. Id. at 9, 11 (examining the argument that taxes should apply only to 
those activities taxpayers would engage in regardless of whether those activities 
are taxed, and no tax should apply to those activities taxpayers would conversely 
abstain from, if taxed). 
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This somewhat ambivalent view of the harm associated 
with tax evasion is reflected in the high mens rea necessary to 
find criminal liability for tax evasion. A heightened mens rea 
suggests that only a high degree of culpability merits criminal 
sanction. Conduct constituting violation of tax laws is not 
viewed as truly blameworthy, hence not immoral, until the 
high threshold is met. The Supreme Court's recent cases sup- 
port this basic idea. 
While the Court has used heavy and sinister adjectives to 
describe both tax evasion and tax evaders, it has not directly 
broached the subject of morality and tax evasion. Rather, the 
Court's judgment appears to be that tax evaders do not commit 
moral wrongs, thus suggesting there is no moral component to 
tax laws.14' 
In Ratzlaf v. United States,lso the Court considered con- 
duct relating to "just avoiding the tax" or a possible risk of a n  
IRS audit to be "no great sin."lsl In Ratzlaf, Ratzlaf and his 
wife, with cash to satisfy a $160,000 gambling debt, were told 
by casino and various banks' personnel that a cash transaction 
over $10,000 requires filing a report. Not wanting a written 
report of the transaction, Ratzlaf purchased separate cashier's 
checks of $9,500 from various banks. The Supreme Court held 
that to convict Ratzlaf of willfully structuring this transaction 
to avoid the reporting requirement, the government had to 
prove both that Ratzlaf knew of the reporting requirement and 
purposefully evaded it, and that he knew his conduct in evad- 
ing such a requirement was illegal.152 
In both Ratzlaf and Cheek v. United Statesls3 (discussed 
below), punishment for tax evasion appears to require disobedi- 
ence to tax laws intertwined with "some element of moral 
149. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 
S. Ct. 655 (1994), distinguished taxpayers who legitimately commit acts of tax 
avoidance such as giving $10,000 in two payments, one on December 31 and the 
other the next day, to avoid the impact of a gift tax, or bringing in "$9,500 in 
cash to the bank twice a week in lieu of transporting over $10,000 once a week" 
to prevent triggering IRS reports and a possible audit, from tax evaders who are 
"bad men who attempt to elude" reporting requirements by "such criminal activity 
as tax evasion." Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at  660. 
150. 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994). 
151. Currency Transactions, supra note 129, at 3366 (noting Justice Scalia's ap- 
parent contrast in oral argument of the conduct of a defendant who avoids a 
stamp tax and that of the defendant in Ratzlaf, who avoided a reporting require- 
ment). 
152. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. a t  657. 
153. 498 U.S. 192 (1991). 
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blameworthiness" to conclusively show the evader's conduct 
evinced an "obviously evil" or inherently "bad" motive akin to 
mala in se crimes, or a t  least show the evader knowingly and 
deliberately disobeyed the state's authority.ls4 
The Supreme Court also placed the standard in sharp focus 
in Cheek u. United States. In Cheek, The Supreme Court placed 
the Seventh Circuit in line with other Courts of Appeal in hold- 
ing that a tax evader who sincerely, and in good-faith, misun- 
derstands o r  believes that she is not violating the tax laws 
escapes criminal liability for willful tax evasion.155 Though 
Cheek did not raise the issue in his briefs, the Court decided 
that Cheek's secondary belief, formed after a careful investiga- 
tion, that the tax laws are unconstitutional and thus invalid, 
does not negate willfulness. 15' 
The Court's explanation of why Cheek's good-faith belief 
that he is not violating the tax laws negates willfulnes deviates 
from the common law presumption that citizens know the law: 
"[Iln our complex tax system, uncertainty often arises even 
154. Currency Transactions, supra note 129 (quoting Ratzlaf's counsel's asser- 
tion in oral argument that "'evading' has been read as meaning avoiding" to ex- 
tract moral considerations); Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. a t  662; Cheek, 498 U.S. at  205-206. 
Despite Justice Scalia's conclusion that avoiding the IRS reporting requirement 
amounted to "avoidance of a non-burden and therefore avoidance with the smell of 
malefaction about it" for no apparent reason than to hide from the government 
"cash that came from God knows where because it wasn't reported on the income 
tax returns," he joined the Ratzlaf majority in holding that structuring cash trans- 
actions to avoid such requirements is not "so obviously 'evil' or inherently bad'" as 
to manifest a "purpose to do wrong, which suffices to show willfulness." Currency 
Transactions, supra note 129, at  3366 (quoting Justice Scalia at  Ratzlaf oral argu- 
ment); Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 666 n.6; see also id. at 662. 
155. Id.; see Dwight W. Stone 11, Note, Cheek v. United States: Finally, A 
Precise Definition of the Willfulness Requirement in Federal Tax Crimes, 51 MD. L. 
REV. 224 (1992). 
156. Cheek, 498 US.  at 206. At trial, Cheek testified that he was "indoctrinat- 
ed" by others to believe the tax laws were unconstitutional, a belief he claimed 
was affirmed by his own study. Id. at 195-96. The Court distinguished United 
States v. Murdock, 290 US.  389 (1933), where the defendant faced criminal charg- 
es for refbsing to answer an IRS examiner's questions. In Murdock, the defendant 
mistakenly believed his refusal was privileged under the Fifth Amendment. Cheek, 
498 U.S. at  206 n.10. Unlike Cheek's constitutional claims, Murdock's claims negat- 
ed willfulness because "it was a claim of privilege not to answer, not a claim that 
any provision of the tax laws were unconstitutional, and not a claim for which the 
tax laws provided procedures to entertain and resolve." Id. Justice White distin- 
guishes Murdock on the basis that in Murdock the defendant wrongly believed he 
had a constitutional right to refuse to provide self-incriminating information. 
Cheek's belief that filing a return would violate his right against self incrimination 
apparently parallels Murdock, yet the result is different. It would seem that Cheek 
could not both protect his right and comply with the law. 
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among taxpayers who earnestly wish to follow the law. . . . [Ilt 
is not the purpose of the law to penalize frank difference of 
opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of reason- 
able care."157 
However, a s  to Cheek's secondary, studied belief tha t  the 
tax laws are unconstitutional and thus invalid, the Court 
warned: 
Claims that some of the provisions of the tax code are uncon- 
stitutional are submissions of a different order. They do not 
arise from innocent mistakes caused by the complexity of the 
IRC. Rather, they reveal full knowledge of the provisions at 
issue and a studied conclusion, however wrong, that those 
provisions are invalid and unenf~rceable. '~~ 
Regarding this secondary belief, the Court said that  if 
Cheek's sole defense was that  he believed the tax laws were 
unconstitutional, he cmld have challenged the constitutionality 
of the tax laws without risk by paying the assessed taxes, filing 
for a refund, and appealing any denial. He could also have 
challenged the assessment in Tax Court without paying and 
appealing if necessary.159 Otherwise, Cheek could raise the 
constitutionality of the laws as a defense to criminal prosecu- 
tion "but like defendants in criminal cases in other contexts, 
who 'willfully' refuse to comply with the duties placed upon 
them by the law, he must take the risk of being wrong."160 
157. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 205 (citing United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360- 
61  (1973) (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 496 (1943))). 
158. Id. at 205. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at  206. Justice Scalia concurred in the Court's judgment. He agreed 
that a good faith misunderstanding of the,  law need not be reasonable to negate 
willfulness. He disagreed with the Court's decision that a defendant's good faith 
belief that a law is unconstitutional does not negate willfulness: "It is quite impos- 
sible to say that a statute which one believes unconstitutional represents a 'known 
legal duty.'" To impose a legal duty, a law must be valid. If a defendant believes 
that a law is invalid, then he believes it imposes no duty and he has not violated 
a "known legal duty." Id. at 207-08 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia finds civil 
penalties for tax code violations to be adequate deterrents to taxpayer misconduct. 
Justice Blzckmun (with Marshall) dissented because the complexity of the tax 
laws did not cause the violations and Cheek's assertions of belief were so unrea- 
sonable as to be "incomprehensible." Id. at 209 (Blackmun & Marshall, JJ., dissent- 
ing). The dissent expressed concern that permitting unreasonable beliefs to negate 
willfulness will encourage frivolous claims and defenses. The dissent also claims 
that requiring reasonableness places an additional burden on the government 
(which must prove unreasonableness) rather than on the defendant. Id. at 210 
(Blackmun & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). 
562 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
The Cheek majority correctly rejects the notion that a good- 
faith misunderstanding must be reasonable to negate willful- 
ness. Congress intended to impose criminal penalties only for 
knowing and intentional violations of federal tax law. If defen- 
dants do not know that their conduct violates the law and do 
not intend to violate the law, then their conduct is innocent 
even if unreasonable. Innocent violations should not subject 
defendants to criminal penalties. In other words, a belief in the 
morality (as opposed to the mere constitutionality) of one's be- 
liefs may suspend criminal liability for violations of the tax 
laws.161 
The majority makes a poor argument for placing the risk of 
error on the taxpayer who believes the tax laws are unconstitu- 
tional.16' Justice White quotes Spies v. United States as ex- 
cusing tax law violations resulting from either innocent error or 
"frank difference of opinion," but he then ignores Cheek's frank 
difference of opinion excuse.163 A good-faith but erroneous be- 
lief that a law is unconstitutional seems the essence of a frank 
difference of opinion. 
Ratzlaf exemplifies the "trifling weight" of tax code viola- 
tions inasmuch as Ratzlaf's conduct, while prohibited, did not 
sufficiently establish his "nefarious" intent? Because the 
government could not prove that Ratzlaf knew where he 
stood-that his conduct challenged the state's power to regulate 
his behavior and demand obedience to its reporting require- 
ments-Ratzlaf's behavior was not willful. In tax terminology, 
effectively, Ratzlaf's behavior manifested the natural taxpayer 
instinct of trying to avoid the harsh economic impact of a possi- 
ble audit while still managing to remain within the scope of 
respect for the state's power. Ratzlaf's mens rea was either 
common, as in the desire to avoid a tax or an economic con- 
sequence, or absent altogether, thus distinguished from Cheek's 
careful and presumably well-informed study of tax laws and 
their unconstitutionality. 
On the other hand, Cheek's primary claim that he avoided 
paying his taxes because he mistakenly interpreted tax laws 
due to the complexity of the Code, or that he had a good-faith, 
sincere belief that his conduct was not violating the law, negat- 
161. Id. at 205-06. 
162. Id. at 208 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
163. Id. at 205. 
164. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 656. 
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ed his willful intent t o  evade his taxes much like Ratz1af"s 
being unaware of the illegality of his conduct. This mens rea of 
unconsciousness of the illegality of one's conduct, and of con- 
scious but mistaken interpretation of the legality of one's con- 
duct, is in sharp contrast t o  Cheek's secondary mens rea. 
Cheek's mens rea was obviously defiant and consequently a 
danger to the state's power, as evidenced by his protest or 
deliberate disobedience sparked by his belief in the unconstitu- 
tionality of the tax laws. Unlike the Ratzlaf case, the govern- 
ment could prove Cheek knew where he stood in terms of chal- 
lenging the state's power t o  decide the constitutionality of its 
laws since the issue had already been litigated and decided 
against him. 
These cases strongly suggest that violation of the tax laws 
is not a moral proposition. If such violation implicated moral 
considerations, use of the taxing power t o  punish individuals 
would be appropriate. However, the Court in Department of 
Revenue v. Kurth ~ a n c h ' ~ ~  negates any suggestion of a moral 
component. In Kurth, the Supreme Court struck down a tax on 
drug possession and storage, levied independent and aside from 
criminal penalties, because such a tax, "imposed on criminals 
and no others, departs so far from normal revenue laws as t o  
become a form of p~nishment."'~~ Rejecting as inapplicable 
the approach which would allow such a tax statute if it "merely 
reimburses the government for its actual costs arising from the 
defendant's criminal conduct," the Kurth majority gave several 
examples of taxes that are legiti~nate.'~~ 
165. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994). 
166. Id. at  1948. That the tax was labeled civil as opposed to criminal was of 
no moment: a tax subsequent and in addition to criminal penalties is inappropriate 
if its purpose "may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent 
or retribution." Id. at 1945 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 
(1989)). 
167. Id. (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 449-50). The test, first articulated in 
Halper, provided that a penalty was punitive, thus inappropriate, if its purpose 
was not to reimburse the government. The Kurth Court distinguished Halper by 
characterizing its present task as analyzing whether a tax, as opposed to a penal- 
ty, is punitive. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented but agreed that Halper was 
inapplicable because "[tlax statutes need not be based on any benefit accorded to 
the taxpayer or on any damage or cost incurred by the Government as a result of 
the taxpayer's activities." Id. at  1950 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Rehnquist noted 
that a drug tax has been held a "true tax" rather than a penalty since "[ilt is 
beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it 
regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activity taxed." Id. (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) (uphold- 
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According to the Court in Kurth, taxes are legitimate if 
they are imposed under several theories. For example, legiti- 
mate taxes "generate government revenues, impose fiscal bur- 
dens on individuals, and deter certain behavior."168 A tax 
with a particularly steep rate or an "obvious deterrent purpose" 
does not necessarily evince an inappropriate use of the power 
to tax.'" Nor are "mixed-motive" taxes, such as high "sin tax- 
es imposed on lawful products" like cigarettes t o  "reduce con- 
sumption and increase government revenue," an illegitimate 
use of the power to tax.'?' 
However, when taxes become prohibitive, and take on 
moral overtones in the context of this Article, the Court will 
not allow such taxes to be imposed: "there comes a time in the 
extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it 
loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty with 
the characteristics of regulation and p~nishment." '~~ The 
Court explained that "unusual features" distinguish a punitive 
tax from legitimate taxes. '" 
For example, a tax is illegitimate if i t  "is conditioned on 
the commission of a crime. That condition is 'significant of 
penal and prohibitory intent, rather than the gathering of reve- 
ing a tax on marijuana transfers as a civil sanction) and citing Marchetti v. Unit- 
ed States, 390 U.S. 39, 44 (1968) (unlawful activity is taxable)); see also First Uni- 
tarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 311 P.2d 508, 525 (1957) (Traynor, J., dis- 
senting), reu'd, 357 U.S. 545 (1958) (refusing to uphold an  oath of loyalty in con- 
nection with taxation: "Even in the face of a bona fide danger, the state has no 
power to embark on an unnecessary wholesale suppression of liberty"). C f  Crowe, 
supra note 3, at  23 ("a tax on Mass wine for hindering or hampering its use, 
would be an unjust tax" in that it "interferes with rights which are outside the 
competence of the civil government"). 
The Kurth majority also refused to address whether "an ostensibly civil pro- 
ceeding that is designed to inflict punishment may bar a subsequent proceeding 
that is admittedly criminal in character" as that issue was not raised by the Kurth 
tax statute. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at  1947 11.21. 
168. Id. at 1945. According to dissenting Chief Justice Rehnquist, "[tlaxes are 
customarily enacted to raise revenue to support the costs of government" hut also 
"may be enacted to deter or even suppress the taxed activity." Id. at 1950 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
169. Id. at 1946. 
170. Id. at 1951-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at  1947. 
171. Id. at 1946 (citing A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 46 (1934)) 
(quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)). The proposition that taxes 
are inappropriate if used as penalties is in accord with the opinion of some schol- 
ars who assert that "one is obligated to pay only those taxes that are not penal in 
nature," i.e., imposed for the commission or omission of an act. McGee, supra note 
14, at  417 (citing Crowe, supra note 3, at 75). 
172. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1940. 
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nue.' "IT3 In addition, any economic and arguably morally- 
neutral purpose behind a mixed motive tax and the tax itself is 
rendered illegitimate, and "justifications [for such a tax] vanish 
when the activity is completely forbidden, for the legitimate 
revenue-raising purpose that might support such a tax could be 
equally well served by increasing the fine imposed upon convic- 
tion."lT4 A tax is also inappropriately punitive if it serves an 
apparent purpose that is either "arbitrary" or "~hocking."'~~ 
In Kurth, the Court found the tax "has an unmistakable pu- 
nitive character" because it is imposed a t  a high rate and for 
"'possession' of goods that no longer exist and that the taxpayer 
never lawfully possessed.'y176 These limitations the Court im- 
poses on the power to tax are appropriate if violation of tax 
laws has no moral component. 
A necessary corollary is that the circumstances under 
which a taxpayer deserves punishment, or at least must make 
good a tax obligation, for a violation of tax law must be circum- 
scribed. For example, taxpayers should be able to enforce their 
constitutional rights without risking criminal penalties: civil 
penalties are daunting enough. The Court in Cheek stated that 
taxpayers, like criminal defendants, must bear the risk of being 
wrong. But Congress did not intend to treat errant taxpayers 
like other criminal defendants: it precluded imposition of crimi- 
nal penalties for tax code violations unless those violations 
were willful. 
The real problem here seems to be whether Cheek could 
have a good-faith belief that the tax laws are unconstitutional 
when the specific claims he raised had already been litigated 
and decided against him. At some point Cheek must accept the 
173. Id. at 1947 (quoting United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 
(1935)). 
174. Id.; see also id. at 1949-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at  1952-53 
(O 'Co~or ,  J., dissenting) (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at  448-50) ("the power to tax 
illegal activity carries with it the danger that the legislature will use the tax to 
punish the participants for engaging in that activity," and "a civil sanction will be 
considered punishment to the extent that it serves the purposes of retribution and 
deterrence, as  opposed to furthering any nonpunitive objective"); id. at  1959-60 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (preferring to "put the Halper genie back in the bottle" and 
inquiring whether the "tax proceeding . . . constituted a second criminal prosecu- 
tion," but agreeing with the majority that Kurth does not present "an adjudicated 
fine that can be judicially reduced to a lower level, but rather a tax; and so we 
grapple with the different, though no less peculiar, inquiry: when is a tax so high 
(or so something else) that it is a punishment?"). 
175. Id. at 1952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
176. Id. at 1948. 
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ourts' adverse decision. At the core of the Court's difficulty with 
Cheek's conduct is that Cheek seems t o  deny the Court's au- 
thority to  decide the constitutionality of the tax laws. 
Until a tax law is challenged in court, other taxpayers who 
believe in good faith that the law is unconstitutional should not 
be penalized for "willful" vi01ations.l~~ The Court could have 
reached the desired result by holding that a persistent personal 
belief that a law which the courts have held valid is unconsti- 
tutional is not a good-faith belief which negates willfulness. 
Once tax protesters fail to convince the courts of their beliefs, 
they must lobby the legislature for change. 
If defendants' beliefs are clearly unreasonable and the 
defendants cannot adequately explain how they acquired those 
unreasonable beliefs, then, according t o  Cheek, juries should 
find that the beliefs were not held in good faith.'?' Perhaps 
the tax laws are only meant to  deter independently "wrong" 
conduct like fraud and deliberate disobedience: as long as the 
taxpayer honestly attempts t o  comply with the Code's require- 
ments, she will not be punished but need only compensate the 
g0~ernment.l~~ This interpretation comports with the Su- 
preme Court's holding in Cheek that a taxpayer's good faith 
mistake of law, no matter how unreasonable, negates the stat- 
utory requirement of willfulness for criminal tax penalties. 
Without some independently wrong conduct, the tax law vio- 
lator suffers only civil penalties.lsO 
The requirement of willfulness reflects not a moral duty to 
obey just laws, but rather a legal obligation t o  submit t o  the 
state's authority. In Cheek, the Supreme Court excused tax 
177. This sounds uncomfortably close to the "every dog is entitled to one bite" 
axiom. The main point is that a prior unsuccesshl challenge is a fact, among 
many, which tends to show a lack of good faith. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 152-161. 
179. See supra text accompanying notes 163-174. 
180. Even civil penalties, however, may so far exceed compensation as  to be 
clearly punitive. But see Mark D. Yochum, Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse 
Except For Tax Crimes, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 221, 227-35 (1989) (mistake of law de- 
fense only protects the "crafty"; criminal penalties are needed to restore respect for 
the tax laws-the taxpayer should act at her peril). 
The requirement of independently wrong conduct to justifjr criminal punishment 
of tax evaders may be analogous to the requirement of independently tortious con- 
duct to justify punitive damages for breach of contract. Leslie E. John, Note, For- 
mulating Standards for Awards of Punitive Damages in the Borderland of Contract 
and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2033, 2045-48 (1986). Cheek seems to require fraud or 
deliberate disobedience for criminal tax penalties. Similarly, tortious breach of con- 
tra& entails fraud, malice or oppression. Id. a t  2054-55. 
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violations resulting from a good-faith misunderstanding of the 
law even if the misunderstanding is unreasonable. Inadvertent 
errors, even if ridiculous, do not challenge the state's authority. 
The Court refused to excuse violations based on a good-faith 
but mistaken belief that the laws are unconstitutional: such 
violations reflect citizens7 claims that they, and not the state, 
may decide when laws are unjust.lS1 
Citizens who disobey on such grounds choose to challenge 
the state's authority and will be punished when their judgment 
conflicts with the state's. Cheek's and Ratzlafs mens rea re- 
quirements do not imply a judgment as  to when tax laws are 
unjust, but rather a judgment a s  to who may decide when they 
are unjust. According to the Supreme Court, the state will 
decide and citizens must obey or risk punishment. Many citi- 
zens will obey, not because the laws are just nor because they 
impose a moral obligation, but only because those citizens do 
not wish to risk punishment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The tax laws impose duties on all citizens and arguably 
create a right in taxpayers to the compliance of other citizens. 
But taxpayers' duties are voluntarily undertaken, at least in  
the sense that they arise only if individuals realize income or 
participate in an economic exchange. Citizens may forego such 
income and economic exchanges to avoid tax liability. If the tax 
laws create rights in third parties, it is only in the vague, emo- 
tional sense of requiring fairness in tax administration: taxpay- 
ers have no enforceable legal right to others7 compliance. Indi- 
viduals may refuse to pay taxes for any number of reasons. 
Some refuse simply out of self interest. Others may refuse on 
moral grounds. Of this second group, individuals may refuse for 
various reasons: they may believe the tax laws are unfairly 
structured; they may deny the state's legitimacy in general; 
they may object to the state's distribution of revenues; or they 
may feel so strongly about particular expenditures that they 
cannot, in good conscience, support those expenditures by pay- 
ing their taxes. 
Legal and political philosophers of all persuasions have 
failed to produce a convincing argument for a moral duty to 
obey the law. Some have shown good cause, however, to deny 
181. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 205-06. 
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that such a duty exists. If individuals have no general moral 
obligation to obey the law, few will have a specific moral duty 
to obey tax laws. 
The minimal support moral theorists have been able to 
muster for a moral duty to obey law evaporates in the context 
of taxation. Consent theories of social contract fail because few 
individuals would agree to be subject to the system of taxation 
in place. Theories of moral duty based on equitable principles 
are insupportable because the tax system is rife with inequity. 
Utilitarian theory fails because the act of not paying taxes is of 
greater utility to the taxpayer than payment. Moreover, rule- 
based utilitarian theory requires moral imprimatur, a circular 
argument. 
The tension between a citizen's moral autonomy and the 
state's authority cannot be resolved by the assertion common to 
democratic political theory that unjust laws do not bind. Either 
the state or the citizen must have the authority to decide when 
laws are unjust. Since citizens are legally bound to follow a law 
even if their moral and political convictions indicate that the 
law is unsound, the state must assume this authority. 
Any suggestion that there is an inherent moral duty to 
obey the law is both counterproductive and superfluous. I t  is 
counterproductive because it purports to release individuals 
from duties of conscience: as long as they comply with the let- 
ter of the law, they may pursue self interest without consider- 
ing any burdens they impose on others. Government is left 
with the ungainly and constant task of searching for and clos- 
ing all loopholes. The duty is superfluous because individuals 
have specific moral duties to act justly-to refrain from acts 
which harm others-whenever feasible. 
The Supreme Court has never found moral absolutes with 
regard to taxation. Rather, the Court has recognized that a 
necessary corollary to the power to tax is the power to police 
affronts to the power. At the same time, law must pay heed to 
taxpayer inclinations to maintain any significant degree of 
effectiveness. Thus, the government accepts taxpayers' self- 
interested attempts to minimize tax liability. However, if 
government's authority or very existence is threatened by over- 
zealous minimization efforts, it figuratively thrusts the taxpay- 
er off the plank. Tax laws, by inference, do not implicate 
eternal principles. 
A moral obligation to obey tax laws is found neither in 
harm done to others, nor simply because laws may compel us to 
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obey. The government is uniquely challenged when enforcing 
tax laws because, unlike other public welfare offenses, compli- 
ance is vital to its function, and the lack of a moral obligation 
to pay taxes ensures that compliance will not be readily ob- 
tained. Holmes' dictum, that "[tJhe law can ask no better justi- 
fication than the deepest instincts of man," remains undeniably 
true? 
182. Holmes, supra note 91, at 477. 
